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Inconvenient  as  barter  obviously  is,  it represents  a great  step  forward  from  a state  of 
self-sufficiency  in  which  every  man  had  to  be  a jack-of-all-trades  and  master  of  none....If 
we  were  to  construct  history  along  hypothetical,  logical  lines,  we  should  naturally  follow 
the  age  of  barter  by  the  age  of  commodity  money.  Historically,  a great  variety  of 
commodities  has  served  at  one  time  or  another  as  a medium  of  exchange:  .  ..tobacco. 
leather  and  hides,  furs,  olive  oil,  beer  or  spirits,  slaves  or  wives...huge  rocks  and 
landmarks,  and  cigarette  butts.  The  age  of  commodity  money  gives  way  to  the  age  of 
paper  money....  Finally,  along  with  the  age  of  paper  money,  there  is  the  age  of  bank 
money,  or  bank  checking  deposits.  [Samuelson  1973,  pp.  274-61 
Although  this  explanation  of  the  origins  of  money  and  of  banking  is  taught  in  almost  all  money 
and  banking  courses,  it has  no  historical  foundation  and  is  internally  inconsistent.  There  is  an 
alternative  approach  that  emerges  from  a comparative  analysis  of  economic  institutions.  This 
article  attempts  to  integrate  the  various  strands  of  this  alternative  view  of  the  origins  of  money 
and  the  development  of  the  modem  financial  system  in  a manner  that  is  consistent  with  the 
historical  facts. 
Previous  Institutionalist  work  in  the  area  of  the  history  of  money  has  used  comparative 
analysis  to  successfully  counter  the  orthodox  story  presented  above,  but  this  work  has  failed  to 
recognize  how  an  understanding  of  the  role  money  plays  in OUT  economy  helps  in  analyzing  the 
nature  of  its  origins  and  the  role  it played  in  pre-capitalist  society.  Because  it  builds  on  this 
understanding  of  money  in  a modem  economy,  what  follows  will  differ  significantly  from  the 
Institutionalist  tradition  based  on  the  work  of  comparative  anthropologists  and  comparative 
’ Resident  Scholar,  The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute,  and  Assistant  Professor  of  Ecotwrnics,  University  of Denver. 
Presented  at  the  Association  for  Evolutionary  Economics  meeting,  New  Orleans,  January  1992.  The  author  would  like  to 
thank  Richard  Day,  John  Henry,  Jan  Kregel,  David  Levine,  Anne  Mayhew,  Perry  Mehrling,  and  Terry  Neaie  for  suggestions. 
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THE  ORTHODOX  STORY 
According  to  the  orthodox  story,  barter  replaced  self-sufficiency  and  increased  efficiency  by 
allowing  for  specialization.  ’  It  was  then  discovered  that  further  efficiency  could  be  gamed  by 
using  some  object  as  a medium  of  exchange  to  eliminate  the  necessity  of  a happy  coincidence 
of  wants  required  for  barter  to  take  place.  Thus,  money  springs  forth  to  facilitate  exchange  by 
lubricating  the  market  mechanism,  which  had  previously  relied  upon  barter:  money  is  created  to 
minimize  transactions  costs.  Further,  “fairground  barter”  replaced  “isolated  barter”  because  this 
lowered  the  cost  per  unit  of  time  taken  to  complete  a transaction.  Thus,  the  development  of 
money  and  markets  allowed  the  economy  to  move  toward  its  optimum  position  represented  by 
the  lowest  transactions  costs. 
The  argument  is  extended  to  the  development  of  fiat  money  by  noting  that  in  the  17th  century, 
commodity  money  was  commonly  deposited  with  “goldsmiths”  for  safekeeping  against  receipts 
called  “goldsmiths’  notes”.  Time  and  effort  (now  called  shoe  leather  costs)  could  be  saved  by 
exchanging  notes,  rather  than  by  reclaiming  the  gold  each  time  an  exchange  was  made. 
Goldsmiths  discovered  that  as  a result,  some  notes  were  permanently  in  circulation  so  that  the 
gold  they  represented  was  never  withdrawn.  Thus,  they  could  safely  lend  these  gold  reserves,  or 
issue  additional  receipts  as  loans, 
Since  the  costs  of  writing  out  the 
also  a rational  economic  decision 
creating  the  equivalent  of  modern  fractional  reserve  banking. 
receipts  was  less  than  mining  gold,  goldsmith  “banking”  was 
taken  by  the  economy  to  reduce 
structure;  paper  money  thus  replaced  commodity  money. 
However,  as goldsmiths  had  to  keep  some  commodity  money  to 
the  costs  of  the  transactions 
facilitate  clearing  with  other 
goldsmiths  and  for  deposit  withdrawals,  the  quantity  of  paper  money  issued  would  be  closely 
governed  by  the  quantity  of  commodity  money  held  in  reserve.  Some  of  the  goldsmiths 
gradually  specialized,  and  the  modern  private  banking  system  emerged,  based  on  fractional 
reserve  deposit  banking.2  Somehow,  governments  began  to  compete  by  issuing  fiat  money 
either  through  their  treasuries  or  through  their  central  banks.  Private  banks  were  permitted  (or 
2 required)  to  hold  this  governmental  (or  quasi-governmental)  fiat  money  as reserves.  Thus,  an 
increase  in  the  issue  of  government  fiat  money  would  lead  to  a multiple  expansion  of  bank 
deposits  in  the  fractional  reserve  system. 
While  the  deposit  multiplier  might  vary,  central  bank  control  over  the  privately-issued  supply 
of  paper  money  (and,  later,  demand  deposits)  is ensured  through  control  of  bank  reserves.  In 
order  to  prevent  excessive  money  from  being  privately  created,  the  central  bank  must  closely 
regulate  the  quantity  of  reserves.  Lack  of  moral  fiber  on  the  part  of  the  authorities  leads  to 
excessive  reserves  and  to  excessive  money.  When  the  public  finds  itself  with  too  much  money, 
it  spends  the  excess,  causing  inflation.  Thus,  the  primary  responsibility  of  the  central  bank  is  to 
serve  as  an  inflation  guard  dog.3 
TOWARD  AN  INSTITUTIONALIST  CRITIQUE 
The  orthodox  story,  in  which  the  present  is  a linear  descendant  of  the  past,  relies  critically  on 
an  approach  identified  as  “hypothetical,  logical”  in  the  passage  by  Samuelson  above.  The 
orthodox  economist  views  our  economy  as  a more-or-less  free  market  economy  in  which  only 
real  variables  matter  (at  least  for  the  long  run)  and  in  which  neutral  money  is  used  primarily  to 
facilitate  exchange  of  real  goods,  undertaken  by  self-interested  maximizers  for  personal  gain. 
The  origins  of  money  are  then  discovered  by  abstracting  from  this  hypothetical  economy  to  an 
economy  that  is  an  exact  replication  save  one  feature:  it  does  not  use  money.  The  conventional 
economist  then  compares  these  two  economies  and  finds  that  the  one  using  money  faces  lower 
transactions  costs.  Money  must,  therefore,  have  been  created  to  reduce  the  transactions  costs  that 
arise  in  barter.  Historical  detail  can  then  be  added  to  the  picture;  mental  gymnastics  ensure  that 
no  historical  “fact”  conflicts  with  the  basic  Neoclassical  view  of  the  world.  “Money”  can  be 
discovered  in  almost  any  society  (past  or  present)  if  one  is  willing  to  include  as  money 
“tobacco,  leather  and  hides,  furs,  olive  oil,  beer  or  spirits,  slaves  or  wives...huge  rocks  and 
landmarks,  and  cigarette  butts”,  as  Samuelson  is  wont  to  do.  [Samuelson  1973,  pp.  274-61  If 
such  objects  cannot  be  found  in  a particular  society,  one  can  always  argue  that  this  society 
merely  has  not  yet  discovered  money.  All  societies  are  based  on  exchange,  or  at  least  would  be 
3 if  natural  propensities  were  allowed  to  flower.  Again,  if  one  is  willing  to  define  almost  any 
human  interaction  as  an  “exchange”,  then  exchange  can  be  found  in  virtually  any  society. 
Finally,  all  such  exchanges  must  be  made  on  the  basis  of  cold  calculation  of  self  gain,  for  no 
other  exchange  could  be rational. 
Institutionalists  have  mounted  a several-pronged  attack  on  this  methodology  and  its 
conclusions.  First,  Institutional&s  have  rejected  the  formalist  methodology  adopted  by  orthodox 
economists  in  favor  of  a substantivist  methodology.  [Stanfield,  19861 In  the  formalist 
methodology,  the  economist  begins  with  the  “rational”  economic  agent  facing  scarce  resources 
and  unlimited  wants.  [Dalton,  19711 The  focus,  then,  must  be  on  choice;  implicit  or  explicit 
relative  prices  will  be  generated  (by  an  auctioneer  or  through  tatonnement)  to  guide  choice  as 
rational  agents  maximize.4  Since  the  formalist  methodology  abstracts  from  historical  and 
institutional  detail,  it  must  be  applicable  to  all  human  societies;  indeed,  it is  presumably  relevant 
for  the  study  of  any  organism  capable  of  making  choices.  Institutionalists  instead  argue  that 
economics  has  to  do  with  a study  of  the  institutionalized  interactions  among  humans  and 
between  humans  and  nature.5  The  economy  is  a component  of  culture,  or  more  specifically,  of 
the  material  life  process  of  society.  As  such,  substantivist  economics  cannot  abstract  from  the 
institutions  that  help  to  shape  economic  processes;  and  the  substantivist  problem  is  not  the 
formal  one  of  choice,  but  one  concerning  production  and  distribution.6 
The  universalist,  formalistic  method  might  be rejected  because  institutions  matter  since  these 
influence  (and  indicate)  production  and  distribution  arrangements  adopted  by  society.  If  these 
vary  across  cultures  or  over  time,  this  could  indicate  that  different  social  approaches  have  been 
taken  to  questions  of  production  and  distribution.  This  dictates  a comparative  methodology: 
comparative  anthropology  addresses  differences  across  cultures,  while  comparative  history  deals 
with  the  evolution  of  institutional  arrangements  through  time  (including  within  and  across 
societies).  As  Bloch  argues,  the  comparative  method  should  “analyze  and  isolate  the  ‘originality’ 
of  different  societies”.  [Bloch  1953,  p.  5071 He  claims  that  if  our  analysis  remains  within  the 
bounds  of  one  society,  we  will  never  uncover  the  causes  of  germination  of  a historical 
4 development;  a  “general  phenomenon  must  have  equally  general  causes.”  [Bloch  1953,  p.  5051 
A  series  of  monographs,  each  on  a particular  society,  may  be  quite  useful,  but  “none  of  them, 
working  separately,  is  able  to  provide  the  solution”  to  a question  concerning  the  general  causes 
of  a general  phenomenon;  “on  the  other  hand,  monographs  become  important  only  because  the 
comparative  method  can  elicit  from  the  chaotic  multiplicity  of  circumstances  those  which  were 
generally  effective--the  real  causes”.  [Bloch  1953,  pp.  505-5061  Use  of  the  comparative  method 
allows  one  to  “isolate  the  ‘originality’  of  different  societies”  [Bloch  1953,  p.  5071  by  using 
“factual  studies  which  are  detailed,  critical,  and  well-documented”.  [Bloch  1953,  p.  5201 
The  economist  who  wishes  to  use  the  comparative  method  faces  a major  hurdle:  the  economy 
in  most  (all?)  societies  is  “embedded”  in  the  total  social  fabric  so  that  it  is  difficult  to  identify.7 
[Stanfield  1986,  p.  181 This  is  the  corollary  to  the  Institutionalist  rejection  of  the  formalist 
method:  one  cannot  abstract  from  the  institutions  which  shape  (and  are  shaped  by)  society’s  way 
of  “making  a living”.  This  is  particularly  true  of  pre-capitalist  societies,  where  productive 
activities  are  closely  integrated  with  other  social  activities.  [Stanfield  1986,  p.  761 Polanyi 
argued  that  in  pre-capitalist  societies,  the  embedded  economy  is  shaped  by  the  rules  and  norms 
of  the  society;  even  where  self  interested  behavior  exists,  it  must  be  noneconomic  because  the 
community  generally  takes  care  of  all  its  members  and  norms  of  behavior  exert  continual 
pressure  to  eliminate  self  interest  as  a cause  of  economic  behavior.  [Polanyi  1968,  p.  461 While 
this  is  an  effective  critique  of  orthodoxy’s  “homogenous  globules  of  desire”,  it  also  means  that 
economic  phenomena  are  difficult  to  disentangle  from  other,  more  general,  pre-capitalist  social 
behavior.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  comparative  economist’s  task  is  impossible.  In 
capitalist  society,  economic  behavior  achieves  its  highest  degree  of  liberation  from  other  social 
activities;  the  economy  of  capitalist  society  is  the  least  “embedded”.’  If  one  can  develop  an 
understanding  of  economic  phenomena  of  a capitalist  economy,  one  may  use  the  comparative 
method  to  develop  an  understanding  of  pre-capitalist  economies  &  improve  one’s 
understanding  of  the  capitalist  economy.  This  is  because,  as  Stanfield  argues,  the  “facts”  of  the 
capitalist  economy  were  already  embedded  in  noneconomic  social  relations  of  pre-capitalist 
5 societies.  [Stanfield  1986,  p.  541 These  phenomena  become  more  obvious  in  capitalist  Society; 
once  we  understand  their  functioning  within  a capitalist  economy,  we  may  contrast  this  with  the 
role  they  play  in  pre-capitalist  economies. 
A  powerful  critique  of  the  orthodox  story  regarding  money  can  be  developed  using  the 
findings  of  comparative  anthropology,  comparative  history,  and  comparative  economics. 
Institutionalists  have  already  used  the  first  and  second  methods  extensively  and  successfully,  but 
use  of  the  third  prong  has  not  been  extensively  explored.  This  is  not  so  much  the  fault  of  those 
who  have  adopted  the  comparative  approach  as  it  is  the  result  of  economists’  inadequate 
theoretical  understanding  of  the  role  of  money  in  a capitalist  economy.  Given  the  embedded 
nature  of  economic  phenomenon  in  prior  societies,  an  understanding  of  what  money  is  and  what 
it  does  in  capitalist  societies  is  essential  to  this  approach.  This  can  then  be  contrasted  with  the 
functioning  of  pre-capitalist  societies  in  order  to  allow  identification  of  which  types  of  pre- 
capitalist  societies  would  use  money  and  what  money  would  be  used  for  in  these  societies.  This 
understanding  is  essential  for  informed  speculation  on  the  origins  of  money. 
Finally,  the  methodology  used  here  must  be  carefully  distinguished  from  the  orthodox 
approach  as  typified  by  the  quote  from  Samuelson  above.  The  neoclassical  economist  creates  an 
abstract,  formal,  economy  that  is purported  to  represent  the  actual  economy.  An  identical 
economy  is  then  hypothesized  that  does  not  use  money.  These  are  then  “compared”  to  discover 
why  money  was  invented. 
In  contrast,  the  comparative  approach  presented  here  begins  with  an  understanding  of  the  role 
money  plays  in  capitalist  economies,  which  shares  essential  features  with  analyses  developed  by 
a wide  range  of  Institutionalist  and  Post  Keynesian  macroeconomists.’  I  then  use  this 
understanding  and  the  understanding  developed  by  comparative  anthropology  and  comparative 
history  of  pre-capitalist  societies  in  order  to  logically  reconstruct  the  origins  of  money.‘” 
Before  proceeding,  however,  money  should  be  defined.  In  this  approach,  money  cannot  be 
identified  by  its  peculiar  personal  physical  “characteristics”  (malleable,  durable,  transportable), 
nor  by  its  functions  (transactions  medium,  means  of  payment,  etc.)  Rather,  money  is  defined 
6 with  respect  to  the  operation  of  the  economy  as a whole.  Money  is  identified  as  a unit  of 
account;  it  becomes  the  social  measure  of  value  in  all  monetarv  economies.  A  monetary 
economy  is  one  for  which  assets  exist  whose  liquidity  premia  exceed  carrying  costs.  Those 
assets  that  function  as  money  must  carry  a liquidity  premium  that  exceeds  carrying  costs.” 
[Keynes  19641 These  assets  may  have  peculiar  physical  characteristics,  or  they  may  not;  they 
will  have  essential  properties  which  determine  their  liquidity.  In  a monetary  economy,  the 
purpose  of  production  is  to  obtain  money-denominated  assets;  this  can  be  contrasted  with  a 
“barter”  economy,  or  a  “real  wage  economy”  or  a “co-operative  economy”  (these  are  merely 
different  names  for  nonmonetary  economies)  in  which  the  object  of  production  is real,  physical, 
output.  [Keynes  1979,  p.  671 
It  is  necessary  to  distinguish  between  money  and  those  assets  denominated  in  the  money  of 
account.  Thus,  bank  deposits  are  not  money,  but  are  denominated  in  the  social  unit  of  account-- 
that  is,  money  (the  dollar  in  me  US).  Similarly,  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  between  money 
and  those  various  functions  performed  by  assets  denominated  in  the  unit  of  account:  money  is 
not  what  money  does.  Some  money-denominated  assets  function  as  media  of  exchange  or  means 
of  payment.  While  these  functions  are  typically  fulfilled  by  certain  money-denominated  assets, 
this  does  not  make  any  particular  asset  that  so  functions  money.  Much  of  the  confusion  over 
whether  primitive  economies  use  “money”  results  because  those  who  study  such  societies  merely 
look  to  see  whether  these  might  have  any  objects  which  perform  some  of  the  functions  we 
associate  with  modern  “money”.  Once  money  is clearly  separated  from  some  of  the  functions  it 
performs  in  modern  monetary  economies,  it  becomes  apparent  that  primitive  “monies”  are not 
money. 
The  rest  of  this  paper  seeks  to  identify  the  origins  of  money  and  the  development  of  the 
modern  financial  system  on  the  bases  of  this  view  of  money  in  the  modern  economy  and  of  the 
analyses  of  comparative  anthropology  and  comparative  history  of  pre-capitalist  societies. 
PRIMITIVE  “EXCHANGE”  AND  PRIMITIVE  “MONEY” 
The  orthodox  explanation  of  the  origins  of  money  is based  on  the  existence  of  an  economy 
7 based  on  barter  exchange  in  formal  markets  (the  fairground  barter)  which  predates  the 
introduction  of  “money”.  But  this  is  neither  historically  accurate,  nor  is  it  coherent.12  The 
institutional  prerequisites  to  the  development  of  market  exchange  include  the  existence  of 
private,  alienable,  property,  recognition  of  individual  responsibility,  self-interested  behavior,  and 
forward-looking  production.  Yet,  the  historical  examples  of  barter  exchange  used  to justify  the 
traditional  approach  show  none  of  these  characteristics.  I will  argue  first  that  primitive 
“exchange”  or  “barter”  did  not  lead  to  the  development  of  markets;  second,  that  money  did  not 
develop  out  of  primitive  “exchange”;  third,  that  “credit  money”13 predated  commodity  money 
and  government  money;  and  fourth,  that  the  quantity  of  credit  money  has  never  been 
constrained  by  the  quantity  of  central  bank  liabilities  as in  the  “multiplier”  story. 
The  exchanges  that  occur  in  tribal  societies  are  “public  acts  performed  in  regard  to  the  status 
of  persons  and  other  self-propelling  things...”  [Polanyi  1971,  p.  751; these  exchanges  have  as 
their  main  aim  to  “exchange  articles  which  are  of  no  practical  use...”  [Malinowski  1932,  p.  861; 
sometimes  “the  identically  same  object  is exchanged  back  and  forth  between  the  partners...the 
sole  purpose  of  the  exchange  is  to  draw  relationships  closer  by  strengthening  the  ties  of 
reciprocity”  [Polanyi  1971,  p.  741; exchanges  were  frequently  made  to  equalize  wealth,  rather 
than  to  achieve  mutually  beneficial  allocations  of  resources;  and  there  was  generally  no  fixed 
exchange  rate  among  exchanged  goods--the  exchange  rates  would  depend  upon  the  status  of  the 
parties  to  the  exchange.  [Heinsohn  and  Steiger  1983]‘4 
If  these  exchanges  were  not  market  exchanges,  then  what  are  the  primitive  “monies” 
(Samuelson’s  tobacco,  huge  rocks,  and  wives)  that  have  been  identified  as  being  the  cost 
reducing  solution  to  barter  exchange?  These  “primitive  monies”  are  “used  to  create  social 
relationships...prevent  group  hostility  and  warfare...elevate  one’s  political  position...and  restore 
peaceful  social  relationships  between  persons  and  groups  disrupted  by  conflict...”  [Dalton  1982, 
p.  185).  These  “monies”  are  always  used  in  “special  ways  only”  [Dalton  1982,  p.  1851 and  never 
as  a social  unit  of  account;  the  “special  purpose  monies  or  highly  ranked  treasure  items 
necessary  to  the  transaction”  may  be  used  only  in  specific  ways  and  other  items  cannot  be 
8 substituted  for  them  in  these  specified  transactions  [Dalton  1967,  p.  2641. 
These  “monies”  did  not  function  as media  of  commercial  exchange,  they  did  not  function  as 
common  measures  of  value,  they  did  not  act  as  the  standard  of  deferred  payment,  and  they  most 
certainly  did  not  carry  liquidity  premia  in  excess  of  carrying  costs.  Malinowski’s  study  of  the 
Trobrianders  found: 
It is  obvious  at  once  that  in  economic  conditions  such  as  obtain  among  the  Trobrianders 
there  can  be  no  question  of  a standard  of  deferred  payments,  as payments  are  never 
deferred...In  fact,  the  narrow  range  of  exchangeable  articles  and  the  inertia  of  custom 
leave  no  room  for  any  free  exchange,  in  which  there  would  be  a need  for  comparing  a 
number  of  articles  by  means  of  a common  measure.  Still  less  is  there  a need  for  a 
medium  of  exchange,  since,  whenever  something  changes  hands,  it does  so  because  the 
barterers  directly  require  the  other  article.  [Malinowski  1921,  p.  131 
Similarly,  while  “loans”  existed  in  primitive,  nonmonetary,  societies,  these  were  fundamentally 
different  from  the  forward  contracts  that  characterize  loans  in  monetary  economies.  First,  in  a 
primitive  society,  “loans”  are  always  initiated  by  the  “lender”,  who  forces  the  “debtor”  to  accept 
a gift.  [Dalton  19671 Second,  this  “loan”  is  not  undertaken  by  the  “lender”  with  the  prospect  of 
material  gain,  for  the  chief  motive  is  to  obtain  prestige  precisely  by  destroving  one’s  wealth. 
[Heinsohn  and  Steiger  19891 Third,  in  primitive  societies,  “repayment”  terms  of  a  “loan”  are 
always  fixed  by  social  norms  of  reciprocity  and  redistribution--they  are  never  the  result  of 
private  negotiation  and  contract.  Thus,  in  primitive  societies,  neither  “money”  nor  “loans” 
represent  economic  phenomena--rather,  the  purpose  of  these  is  identical  to  the  purpose  of 
primitive  “exchange”:  to  reproduce  tribal  society  through  reciprocity  and  redistribution. 
On  the  basis  of  historical  and  anthropological  evidence  it can  thus  be  concluded  that  primitive 
barter  exchange  was  not  market  exchange  “without  money”  and  that  the  primitive  “monies”  do 
not  emerge  from  the  reduction  of  transactions  costs  in  the  exchange  process.  Dalton  [1982] 
prefers  to  substitute  the  term  “primitive  valuables”  for  “primitive  monies”  in  analysis  of  most 
primitive  societies  since  “demonstrably,  most  were  not  crude  proxies  for  dollars  or  francs  in 
9 simple  market  transactions”  [Dalton  1982,  p.  1831 While  these  may  have  served  “as special 
means  of  commercial  or  noncommercial  payment  or  exchange  in  primitive,  peasant,  and  archaic 
societies  all  over  the  world”  [Dalton  1982,  p.  1831, they  “are regarded  as  valuables  to  be  used  in 
special  ways  only;  they  are  necessary 
transactions”  [Dalton  1982,  p.  1851. 
This  does  not  mean  that  individuals 
means  of  reciprocal  payment  in  social  and  political 
in  tribal  society  are  completely  lacking  in  self-interested 
behavior,  rather,  that  such  behavior  would  not  normally  be  manifested  in  exchange  for  two 
reasons:  first,  since  the  community  takes  care  of  all  its  members,  gainful  behavior  in  exchange 
is  not  necessary  to  provide  a livelihood;  second,  reciprocity  exerts  continual  pressure  to 
eliminate  self-interest  from  exchange  since  it cannot  benefit  the  individual.‘s  [Stanfield  1986,  p. 
591 Clearly,  such  exchanges  do  not  conform  to  the  orthodox  view  of  profit-seeking  market 
behavior,  but  represent  conventional  behavior  more  akin  to  the  Western  practice  of  gift-giving  at 
Christmas.‘6 
FROM  PRIVATE  PROPERTY  TO  MONEY,  MARKETS,  AND  MONETARY  PRODUCTION 
In  the  alternative  view  presented  here,  primitive  “exchanges”  and  “monies”  cannot  lead  to  the 
development  of  market  exchange  or  to  the  use  of  money,  since  they  do  not  lead  to  the 
institution  of  private  property  which  is considered  to  be  a prerequisite  to  the  development  of 
monetary  production,  that  is,  production  for  sale  in  markets  for  money-denominated  assets.‘? 
“With  the  establishment  of  private  property,  we  at  once  have  the  elements  of  a money 
economy...”  [Heinsohn  and  Steiger  1989,  p.  1931 The  development  of  private,  alienable, 
property”  is  of  crucial  importance  to  the  development  of  markets  and  money  precisely  because 
it  destroys  the  collective  security  of  tribal  or command  society  which  allows  for  ceremonial 
exchange  and  redistribution.  The  introduction  of  private  property  generates  “existential 
uncertainty”  in  which  each  member  of  society  becomes  responsible  for  his/her  (including  family 
members)  own  social  and  economic  well  being.lg 
The  “existential  uncertainty”  that  is  generated  by  the  introduction  of  private  property  is  thus  a 
crucial  element  in  the  alternative  explanation  of  the  passage  from  ceremonial  to  market 
10 exchange.  In  tribal  society,  reciprocal  and  redistributive  modes  of  social  integration  ensure  that 
the  material  needs  of  any  particular  individual  in  society  will  be  met  according  to  the  ability  of 
the  tribe  to  do  so.  This  does  not  mean  that  one  will  never  go  hungry,  but  that  there  is  no 
distinction  between  the  economic  conditions  of  the  individual  and  the  society  as  a whole. 
Anthropologists  note  that  the  typical  case  in  tribal  society  is  one  of  chronic  underoroduction: 
there  is  little  attempt  to  produce  much  beyond  a subsistence  level,  nor  to  hoard  for  unforeseen 
natural  disasters.  The  attitude  commonly  found  in  tribal  society  is  one  of  confidence  that 
biological  needs  wilJ  be  satisfied.  [Stanfield  19861 In  these  societies,  there  is  little  concern  for 
personal  possessions;  indeed,  personal  accumulation  of  property  is  normally  viewed  with 
disdain,  and  is  made  nearly  impossible  by  the  aforementioned  redistribution  and  sharing.  Similar 
conditions  prevail  in  those  societies  based  on  a central  authority  (whether  chief,  king,  or priest), 
who  receives  obligatory  transfers  and  then  redistributes  some  of  this  to  the  community.  While 
such  societies  certainly  are  not  communistic,  the  redistributive  function  tends  to  ensure  some 
minimal  satisfaction  of  material  wants.  Finally,  within  the  feudal  manor  one  again  finds  a nearly 
self-sufficient  economic  unit  whose  redistributive  process  is designed  to  meet  subsistence 
requirements. 
However,  with  the  development  of  private  property  in  land,  one  (usually,  the  individual 
household)  becomes  personally  responsible  for  meeting  material  wants.  As  productive  activities 
become  increasingly  divorced  from  other  social  activities,  that  is,  as reciprocity  and 
redistribution  come  to  play  a very  small  role  in  economic  processes  (while  they  may  still  be  of 
some  importance  in  other  social  activities--Christmas  gift  giving  is  socially  important  although 
economically  insignificant),  existential  uncertainty  is  created  because  the  social  assurance  of  a 
minimal  level  of  subsistence  disappears.  Individual  insurance  could  then  only  be  built  up  by 
producing  and  holding  a margin  of  security  in  the  form  of  excess  production  over  minimum 
needs. 
The  role  of  existential  uncertainty  can  be  seen  in  the  behavior  of  individual  landowners  who 
are  unable  to  meet  their  needs  from  their  own  personal  productive  efforts.  Their  existence  thus 
11 depends  on  being  able  to  borrow  means  of  subsistence  from  other  individuals.  This  is  the  basis 
of  the  first  economic  exchange  and  it  takes  the  form  of  a loan  in  which  one  private  producer 
extends  physical  product  which  he  has  accumulated  as his  margin  of  security  to  a borrower  who 
in  exchange  promises  to  furnish  his  labor  whenever  the  lender  should  require  it  in  order  to 
ensure  his  own  survival. 
Thus,  the  earliest  form  of  economic  exchange  produced  forward  cormacts  which  in  the 
extreme  took  the  form  of  debt  bondage  in  which  the  “debtor  initially  rendered  himself  in  the 
power  of  the  creditor  as  a debt  serf...[and]  the  creditor  at  any  time  during  the  credit  term  could 
call  upon  the  debtor--even  up  to  his  extermination”  [Heinsohn  and  Steiger  1984,  p.  541. When 
debt  bondage  was  abolished2’,  the  creditor  faced  existential  uncertainty  during  the  period  of  the 
contract.  This  uncertainty  was  over  the  lender’s  ability  to  survive  periods  of  depressed 
production.  For  running  this  risk,  the  lender  required  payment  in  the  form  of  interest.  Note  that 
this  is  not  risk  of  failure  of  repayment,  but  the  risk  of  the  lender  failing  to  survive  a change  in 
his  circumstances  as  a result  of  not  having  his  emergency  surplus  available. 
The  abolition  of  bondage  created  the  conditions  under  which  loans  must  include  interest. 
These  loans,  and  interest,  were  initially  “in kind”,  and  in  many  cases,  the  interest  could  be  paid 
out  of  the  natural  fecundity  of  the  loaned  item.  For  example,  the  loan  of  a bushel  of  wheat 
today  can  be  repaid  with  a two  bushels  at the  end  of  next  year.  However,  as  the  types  of  loans 
expanded,  and  as  the  terms  of  repayment  became  standardized,  repayment  would  take  a standard 
form--denominated  in  a unit  of  account,  or  a “money  of  account”.  The  first  money  of  account 
was  a wheat  unit. 
Temples  seem  to  have  played  a role  in  standardizing  the  unit  of  account.  The  creditor  and 
debtor  required  a neutral  witness  to,  and  enforcer  of,  private  contracts.  In  return  for  this  service, 
the  temple  would  receive  a portion  of  the  interest  on  loans.  These  in-kind  fees  (plus  tribute  paid 
to  the  temple)  led  to  the  accumulation  of  large  stocks  of  grain,  animals,  and  other  goods  with 
significant  carrying  costs.  [Heinsohn  and  Steiger  1983,  p.  191 In  order  to  reduce  such  costs,  the 
temple  encouraged  the  development  of  a standardized  wheat  unit  of  account.  This  was  also  to 
12 the  advantage  of  borrowers  and  lenders  for  now  repayment  was  not  necessarily  linked  to  the 
natural  fecundity  of  loaned  items.  Thus,  the  original  wheat  money  of  account  began  to  serve  as 
the  means  of  payment  to  retire  debt  (a cow  loan  is repaid  with  wheat).  The  barley  grain  was 
later  substituted  because  of  its  invariable  unit  weight.  Of  course,  even  barley  grains  entail  large 
transactions  and  storage  costs.  After  temples  began  to  act  as  depositories  for  creditors  (by 
holding  for  them  the  payments  of  debtors),  transactions  costs  could  be  reduced  by  substituting 
stamped  metal  (the  value  of  which  was  determined  by  its  weight  equivalent  to  the  barley  unit  of 
account)  for  barley  on  withdrawal.  Storage  costs  were  reduced  when  the  temple  accepted  the 
stamped  metal  in  payment  of  tribute  or  fees  for  its  service  as witness  in  private  contracts  In 
order  to  deal  with  counterfeiters,  temples  eventually  switched  to  stamped  precious  metals. 
[Heinsohn  and  Steiger  1983,  p.  211 
The  credit  money  created  in  these  private  loan  contracts  thus  eventually  becomes  standardized 
as  a money  of  account.  With  the  development  of  a money  of  account,  and  with  the  creation  of  a 
method  for  witnessing  the  legitimacy  of  private  contracts  (and  of  enforcing  them),  credit  money 
could  finally  circulate  among  third  parties  and  perform  those  functions  associated  with  “money”, 
including  the  medium  of  exchange  function  so  obviously  encountered  in  markets.  Thus,  credit 
money  predates  commodity  money,  and  the  unit  of  account  function  of  money  predates  either 
the  medium  of  exchange  or  means  of  payment  functions. 
The  origins  of  money  are  not  to  be  found,  then,  in  an  hypothesized  exchange  society  based  on 
barter.  Instead,  money  develops  as  a unit  of  account,  or,  as  the  terms  in  which  debts  are  written. 
“A money  of  account  comes  into  existence  along  with  debts...Money  proper  in  the  full  sense  of 
the  term  can  only  exist  in  relation  to  a money  of  account.”  [Keynes  1971,  p.  31 When  private 
loans  are  made,  the  lender  gives  up  private  property  in  exchange  for  an  IOU  issued  by  the 
debtor,  which  represents  a forward  contract.  This  private  contract  must  include  an  interest 
premium,  the  size  of  which  is  determined  by  the  estimate  of  the  existential  uncertainty  faced  by 
the  lender  who  has  given  up  reserves  that  provide  security  in  the  face  of  an  unknowable  future. 
[Heinsohn  and  Steiger  1989,  p,  1921 Thus,  all  forward  contracts  involve  “wheat  now  for  more 
13 wheat  later”  propositions,  which  are  monetary  propositions,  with  money  serving  as  a unit  of 
account. 
The  distinction  made  above  between  “money”  and  “assets  denominated  in  the  money  of 
account”  is  not  so  novel  as  it  appears  to  be  to  the  modern  reader.  Einaudi  [ 19531 offered  a 
detailed  examination  of  the  history  of  a concept  variously  termed  “imaginary  money”,  “ideal 
money”,  “political  money”,  “moneta  numeraria”,  “money  of  account”,  or  “ghost  money”.  He 
traces  this  concept  from  the  sixteenth  century  through  the  eighteenth  century;  one  can  find 
similar  ideas  in  the  current  century  in  the  works  of  Cipolla  [1956;  19761. An  “imaginary  money” 
is  a money  of  account,  commonly  called  a  “pound”  throughout  Europe,  that  never  changes  much 
in  value.  As  Einaudi  correctly  argues  (and  as I will  discuss  in  more  detail  below),  this  money  of 
account  “grew  almost  spontaneously  out  of  men’s  habit  of  keeping  accounts  in  monetary  units”. 
[Einaudi  1953,  p.  2331 As  the  ghost  money  frequently  remained  uncoined,  it  certainly  could  not 
fulfill  that  function  of  money  orthodoxy  takes  as paramount:  medium  of  exchange.  Instead,  the 
ghost  money  was  the  unit  of  account,  the  social  measure  of  economic  value,  the  unit  in  which 
debts  were  measured,  and  the  unit  in  which  exchange  rates  of  all  media  of  exchange  were 
calculated.  For  example,  Einaudi  shows  that  in  the  eighteenth  century,  the  duchy  of  Milan  used 
51  different  coins  and  50  different  monetary  units.  The  value  of  each  of  these,  however,  was 
always  determined  relative  to  the  !&  (pound)  money  of  account  (which  was  not  one  of  the 
coined  units).  [Einaudi  1953,  p.  2431 If  one  of  these  coins  were  debased  (by  clipping  or  through 
reduction  of  the  amount  of  precious  metals  used  in  coinage),  prices  of  commodities  would  rise 
in  terms  of  this  particular  coin  but  not  in  terms  of  the  ghost  money.  This  means,  of  course,  that 
commodity  prices  (in  addition  to  values  of  media  of  exchange)  were  actually  denominated  in 
terms  of  the  @  money  of  account.  As  another  example,  the  Bank  of  Amsterdam,  reputed  to 
be  the  prototype  for  the  Bank  of  England,  issued  no  notes  and  made  no  loans,  but  merely 
offered  depositors  clearing  house  payment  services  in  terms  of  an  “imaginary”  national  money 
of  account.  Similarly,  the  bra  di  banco  was  a unit  of  account,  valued  in  equivalent  gold  weight 
units,  created  by  giro  banks  to  provide  invariable  terms  for  bank  liabilities  used  by  members  of 
14 the  “giro  payment  society”.  [Wray  19901 
In  spite  of  the  frequent  recognition  of  the  common  use  of  “ghost  money”,  previous  economic 
historians  have  incorrectly  viewed  the  money  of  account  as  a  “false”  money,  or  as  a  “mirage”,-- 
an  illusion  that  prevented  economic  agents  from  perceiving  reality.  Einaudi  flatly  states 
“imaginary  money--here  is  my  thesis--is  not  money  at  all”.  [Einaudi  1953,  p.  2371  He  goes  on 
to  argue  as  if  coins  were  invented  to  facilitate  exchange;  and  because  a wide  variety  of  coins 
were  developed,  it  became  necessary  to  invent  an  imaginary  money  to  keep  “the  monetary 
system  in  equilibrium”  by  providing  a monetary  unit  in  which  exchange  rates  could  be 
denominated.  Thus,  Einaudi  traces  Europe’s  imaginary  pound  to  a tenth  century  invention  of 
Charlemagne,  and  attributes  its  creation  to  “the  longing  of  medieval  men  for  the  eternal,  the 
immutable,  the  universal,  accompanied  by  an  abhorrence  of  the  transitory,  the  mutable,  and  the 
particular”.21  [Einaudi  1953,  p.  2463 Einaudi  also  denies  that  the  lira  di  banco  was  a ghost 
money  because  it  had  a physical  representation  as  a bank  liability.  As  I will  argue,  this  story  is 
actually  very  nearly  the  reverse  of  my  position:  “ghost  money”  & money;  its  origins  s  the 
origins  of  money.  Thus,  the  money  of  account  could  not  have  been  invented 
the  reign  of  Charlemagne,  rather,  we  must  look  elsewhere  for  its  origins--to  the  earlier  creation 
of  private  property--and  to  an  alternative  explanation  for  the  existence  of  physical 
representations  of  “ghost  money”,  an  explanation  that  will  be  developed  below. 
By  distinguishing  money  from  the  various  functions  it performs,  we  may  conclude  that 
primitive,  pre-private  property  economies  did  not  use  money.  It is  thus  an  inappropriate  use  of 
the  comparative  method  to  try  to  find  objects  that  fulfill  “money-like”  functions  in  tribal 
societies  and  then  label  these  “money”.  Rather,  our  understanding  of  the  role  money  plays  in 
capitalist  economies  enables  us  to  use  the  comparative  methodology  to  identify  the  contrasts 
between  economies  with  private  property  and  economies  based  on  communal,  reciprocal 
relations--the  latter  do  not  use  money,  although  we  may  find  objects  that  superficially  appear  to 
fulfill  some  of  the  functions  we  now  associate  with  assets  denominated  in  the  money  of  account. 
Unlike  production  in,  say,  a tribal  society,  capitalist  production  always  involves  money.22  The 
15 capitalist  must  hire  workers  to  produce  the  goods  that  will  be  sold  on  markets  (to  workers  and 
other  capitalists).  As  production  takes  time,  the  capitalist  must  pay  wages  now,  before  sales 
receipts  are  realized.23  Furthermore,  because  the  future  is uncertain,  wages  are  paid  in  money 
form;  and  sales  receipts  are  uncertain  because  money  wages  need  not  be  spent  on  any  particular 
output--nor  even  on  output  in  general.  This  means  that  the  capitalist  who  borrows  to  pay  the 
wage  bill  must  pay  interest  and  that  capitalist  production  is  only  undertaken  on  the  expectation 
of  making  profits.  Thus,  capitalist  production  always  involves  “money  now,  for  more  money 
later”.  The  market,  then,  “is not  a place  of  barter...but  a place  for  earning  the  means  of  settling 
debts,  i.e.  money.”  [Heinsohn  and  Steiger  1989,  p.  1931 
Markets  cannot  exist  independently  of  money,  much  less  predate  it.24 The  hypothesized  barter 
economy  assumes  that  individuals  “organize  their  activities  with  the  idea  of  marketing  in  mind” 
before  money  exists.  [Levine  1983,  p.  211 They  specialize  in  producing  commodities  they  do 
not  need  in  order  to  exchange  them  in  the  market  for  desired  commodities.  But  such  production 
requires  the  pre-existence  of  private  property  and  independence  of  individuals.  As  argued  above, 
these  are  the  prerequisites  to  the  development  of  money  as a unit  of  account.  Furthermore,  even 
production  for  (hypothesized)  barter  exchange  in  a private  property  economy  involves  time  and 
uncertainty,  but  these  are  the  additional  prerequisites  for  monetary  production.  Thus,  all  of  the 
prerequisites  for  a monetary  economy  already  exist  in  the  market  economy  that  is  supposed  to 
be  based  on  barter.  Is  it conceivable  that  barter  could  have  predated  the  use  of  money,  even 
though  the  hypothesized  barter  economy  displays  all  of  the  conditions  of  a monetary  economy? 
Levine  [ 19831 argues  that  the  existence  of  a market  requires  diversity  and  variability  of  needs- 
-otherwise,  one  must  suppose  that  the  existing  distribution  of  endowments  (resources,  ability, 
know-how)  just  happens  to  be  such  that  a large  portion  of  the  population  cannot  produce  for  its 
own  needs,  but  must  produce  for  the  market.  Even  if  this  can  be  accepted,  it does  not  seem  to 
generate  the  conditions  required  for  an  innovative,  dynamic  market,  for  production  would  be 
geared  to  satisfy  the  “historically  developed  and  given  modes  of  consumption  and  structures  of 
neediness”.  [Levine  1983,  p.  221 That  is,  the  drive  to  accumulate  is  seriously  constrained  in  the 
16 hypothesized  barter  economy.  Only  in  an  economy  in  which  wealth  is  denominated  in  money 
does  “need”  become  socially  determined  by  the  requirements  of  social  accumulation.  In  a 
monetary  economy, 
individuals  produce  commodities  which  they  do  not  need  because  their  motivation  for 
production  is  the  acquisition  of  wealth  as such  (i.e.,  making  money).  The  separation  of 
producer  from  consumer  supports  a system  of  exchange.  That  separation  comes  about 
because  the  idea  of  wealth  in  general  has  become  a part  of  a way  of  life  and  mode  of 
thinking.  The  penetration  of  the  idea  of  wealth  into  consciousness  makes  pursuit  of 
wealth  through  commodity  production  an  intelligible  goal.  [Levine  1983,  pp.  22-31 
This  separation  of  producer  from  consumer  requires  (for  its  full  development)  the  existence  of 
private  property  and  the  creation  of  a class  of  propertyless  workers.  The  existence  of 
propertyless  workers  also  extended  market  demand,  and  extended  the  medium  of  exchange 
function  of  money.  In  conclusion,  market  supply  is created  as production  becomes  oriented  to 
the  market  to  obtain  money-denominated  assets;  market  demand  exists  because  propertyless 
workers  must  purchase  the  means  of  subsistence  through  the  use  of  money  wages.z 
The  preceding  discussion  has  admittedly  flown  through  several  thousand  years,  covering  the 
whole  period  from  the  first  tentative  movements  away  from  tribal  society  to  the  development  of 
a full-blown  capitalist  society.  On  one  hand,  this  can  be justified  by  the  argument  that  all pre- 
capitalist  societies  are  much  more  similar  with  one  another  than  any  is  with  capitalism.  The 
origins  of  money  lie  in  the  early  development  of private  property;  however,  money  and 
monetary  production  remained  “embedded”  in  noneconomic  social  relations  until  the  emergence 
of  a  “monetary  economy”  relatively  recently.  There  is  no  novelty  in  this  claim;  one  can  find 
similar  arguments  in  Stanfield  [1986],  in  Polanyi  [1968],  and  in  Heilbroner  [1985].  Stanfield 
argues  that  the  major  transition  to  the  modem  economy  occurred  in  the  seventeenth  century, 
during  which  the  Mercantilist  state  took  an  active  role  in  the  creation  of  internal  markets;  from 
this  point  forward,  the  economy 
society.  [Stanfield  1986,  p.  1021 
gradually  emerged  and  began  to  shape 
This  culminated,  according  to  Polanyi, 
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the  rules  and  norms  of 
in  the  conscious  creation of  a  “self-regulating  free  market  economy”  in  the  nineteenth  century,  in  which  the  disembedded 
economy  functioned  without  the  direction  of  authorities.  A  market  myth  was  created, 
summarized  as  the  belief  that  pursuit  of  self-gain  would  achieve  social  provisioning  even 
without  purposeful  pursuit  of  this  social  purpose.  According  to  Polanyi,  the  attempt  at  creating  a 
self-regulating  market  economy  failed,  thus,  engendered  a protective  response  to limit  the 
functioning  of  markets  precisely  because  they  could  not  achieve  social  provisioning.  Finally, 
Heilbroner  argues  that  the  creation  of  capitalist  society  represented  a revolutionary  movement  in 
which  an  economic  system  is  created  whose  overriding  function  is  to  accumulate  “capital”, 
rather  than  to  ensure  social  provisioning.  This  continual  “expansive  metamorphosis  of  capital”  is 
the  essential  logic  of  capitalism.  [Heilbroner  1985,  p.  361 Furthermore,  as  Keynes  argued,  this 
logic  of  accumulation  takes  the  fotm  of  accumulation  of  greater  nominal  values.  Clearly, 
capitalism--a  system  based  on  nominal  accumulation--is  a system  very  different  from  previous 
institutionalized  interactions  among  humans  and  between  humans  and  nature. 
However,  one  cannot  ignore  the  substantial  differences  between  tribal  society--which  does  not 
use  money--and  pre-capitalist  societies  which  do.  Once  private  property  appears,  we  have  the 
origins  of  money  and  the  development  of  markets--markets  have  been  fairly  common  since  the 
later  stone  age.  [Stanfield  1986,  p.  971 Monetary  production,  however,  remains  a much  later 
development.26  As  was  recognized  by  Polanyi,  markets  exist  long  before  a system  based  on 
markets  appears.  While  I am  not  convinced  that  anything  approaching  Polanyi’s  “self-regulating 
free  markets”  ever  existed,  this  is  not  important  for  our  analysis.  It  is  clear  that  markets  can 
exist  in  a variety  of  economic  systems--from  the  tribute  economies  based  on  central  authority,  to 
the  democratic  societies  of  ancient  Greece,  and  from  the  Roman  slave  society  to  the  feudal 
societies  of  Europe.  Even  though  most  production  in  all  of  these  societies  never  entered  markets, 
markets  and  sale  of  goods  for  money-denominated  assets  certainly  played  a role  in  all  of  them. 
This  admission,  however,  concedes  nothing  to  the  Neoclassical  insistence  on  seeing  a natural 
propensity  to  truck  and  barter  in  all  societies.  Rather,  in  most  of 
up  specifically  by  state  intervention;  in  all cases,  states  regularly 
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these  cases,  markets  were  set 
intervened.  Indeed,  Levi- Strauss  defines  exchange  as  a peacefully  resolved  war,  and  likens  exchange  rates  to  peace 
treaties.  [Stanfield  1986,  p.  901 Polanyi  writes  of  the  creation  of  markets  by  generals  to 
provision  armies;  prices  were  not  set  by  the  higgling  and  haggling  of  markets,  rather, 
Traditionally,  trade  carried  no  taint  of  commerce.  In  its  origins  a semi-warlike 
occupation,  it  never  cut  loose  from  government  associations,  apart  from  which  but  little 
trading  could  take  place  under  archaic  conditions....  Treaty  prices  were  matters  of 
negotiation,  with  much  diplomatic  higgling-haggling  to precede  them.  Once  a treaty  was 
established,  bargaining  was  at  an  end.  For  treaty  meant  a set  price  at  which  trading  took 
its  course.  As  there  was  no  trade  without  treaty,  so  the  existence  of  treaty  precluded  the 
practices  of  the  market.  [Polanyi  1971,  pp.  86-71 
The  existence  of  private  property,  money,  and  markets  is  apparently  not  sufficient  for  the 
development  of  a market  system,  or,  better,  a system  based  on  production  for  sale  in  markets  for 
money-denominated  assets.  In  Wray  [ 19901 it is  argued  that  the  extent  of  the  market  would 
remain  limited  until  a substantial  portion  of  the  population  became  propertyless,  thus,  became 
wage  workers.”  As  Stanfield  [1986,  p.  451 argues,  the  hungry  must  obtain  food,  but  how  they 
go  about  obtaining  it  is institutionalized.  The  propertyless,  and  therefore  hungry,  individual  may 
rely  on  family,  on  begging,  on  government  redistribution,  or  on  wages  by  selling  labor  power 
(Polanyi’s  fictitious  cornmodification  of  labor),  each  depending  on  the  response  engendered  by 
institutional  arrangements.  Bloch  [1953]  argues  that  the  creation  of  a pool  of  potential  wage 
laborers  was  accomplished  by  a process  often  (somewhat  narrowly)  called  the  enclosure 
movement.28  Again,  however,  the  “labor  market”  did  not  spring  naturally  from  this 
development,  but  was  gradually  created,  and  the  extent  of production  for  market  would  be 
severely  constrained  until  labor  became  “cornmodified”--a  process  that  resulted  in  part  from 
accelerated  privatization  of  land. 
In  summary,  money  first  existed  as  a unit  of  account  that  was  created  after  the  development  of 
private,  alienable  property  allowed  private  loans.  As  loans  came  to  be  written  in  a standard 
money  of  account,  the  means  of  payment  function  of  money  developed.  This  gradually  led  to 
19 production  for  market  to  earn  the  means  of  settling  debts,  which  generated  a medium  of 
exchange  function  for  money.  The  first  standardized  money  of  account  was  wheat,  but  it  WCIS 
subsequently  replaced  by  barley.  Money,  as  a unit  of  account,  would  be  created  as part  of  a 
forward  debt  contract.  Money  acting  as  a medium  of  exchange  or  means  of  payment  would  take 
a physical  form  (wheat  or  barley,  and  later,  metals,  or  paper  IOUs),  denominated  in  terms  of  the 
idealized  money  of  account.  Because  production  in  a market  system  is  always  monetarv 
production,  its  purpose  is  to  realize  production  in  money  form.  Thus,  the  purpose  of  production 
in  a  “market”  economy  is  to  accumulate  money-denominated  units  of  the  social  measure  of 
wealth.  Accumulation  of  money-denominated  assets  becomes  the  universally  recognized  path  to 
wealth;  the  money  of  account  becomes  the  social  unit  of  value. 
MONEY,  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CENTRAL  BANKING,  AND  THE  EVOLUTION  TO 
THE  MODERN  FINANCIAL  SYSTEM 
Private,  alienable  property  (which  creates  existential  uncertainty--so  long  as historical  time 
exists,  as  in  the  real  world)  and  wage  labor  provide  the  conditions  required  for  monetary 
production,  and  generate  the  necessity  to  accumulate.  Accumulation  of  reserves  denominated  in 
the  money  of  account  increases  individual  security  and  reduces  reliance  on  lending  from  others: 
each  proprietor  tries  to  “set  up  his  own  reserves  as  a source  of  securitv  which  will  protect  him, 
in  an  unknowable  future,  from  the  need  to  ask  credit  of  other--similarly  isolated--proprietors.” 
[Heinsohn  and  Steiger  1989,  p.  1921  These  reserves  consist  of  media  of  exchange  and  means  of 
payment  denominated  in  the  unit  of  account.  (They  may  be  private  IOUs,  commodity  money,  or 
government  fiat  money--the  development  of  these  representations  of  money  will  be  discussed 
below.) 
These  security  reserves  provide  a source  for  lending  to  temporarily  disadvantaged  individuals. 
They  are  lent  at  a rate  of  interest  determined  by  the  risk  the  lender  incurs  from  parting  with  his 
margin  of  safety.  The  existence  of  interest  also  means  that  the  borrower  will  have  to  produce  in 
excess  of  subsistence  in  order  to  meet  the  interest  costs  and  repay  principal.29  This  generates  a 
Ionic  of  accumulation  in  any  society  in  which  most  money  is  created  as part  of  a contract  that 
20 provides  “money  now  for  more  money  later”  and  in  which  production  always  involves  “money 
now  for  more  money  later”.  If  accumulation  falters,  these  nominal  contracts  cannot  be  met. 
The  “logic”  of  a monetary  system,  then,  requires  that  the  nominal  money  supply  expand  by  at 
least  the  amount  necessary  to  meet  the  expansion  of  incomes  due  to  interest  income  growth--if  it 
doesn’t,  a crisis  develops.  Monetary  production  cannot  be  constrained  by  a fixed  money  supply, 
nor  by  a commodity  money  whose  quantity  expands  only  upon  new  discoveries,  for  this  could 
make  it  impossible  to  meet  contractual  commitments  to  pay  interest.  But  since  these 
commitments  are  in  terms  of  the  money-of-account  whose  supply  is  determined  primarily  in  the 
private  contracts  between  debtors  and  creditors,  money  growth  cannot  be  controlled  except  by 
interfering  with  private  initiative  in  stipulating  contracts:  the  quantity  of  wheat-money-of- 
account  can  never  be constrained  by  the  quantity  of  wheat  in  existence.  Rather,  the  quantity  of 
wheat  money  created  in  contracts  is  constrained  by  the  willingness  of  the  lender  to  accept  the 
promise  of  “more  money”  later  in  the  form  of  interest.  The  same  principles  hold  regardless  of 
the  money  unit  of  account  chosen  (whether  it is  the  dollar  or  the  yen),  and  regardless  of  the 
medium  of  exchange  used  (bank  notes,  bank  deposits,  gold  coins,  or  government  money),  which 
would  be  denominated  in  the  money  of  account. 
As  the  money  of  account  is  nothing  more  than  the  terms  in  which  promises  to  repay  or  to 
engage  in  exchange  are  denominated,  anyone  can  create  money,  as  long  as one’s  liabilities  are 
accepted  by  a counter-party  who  is  a willing  participant  in  a forward  contract.  Thus,  by  creating 
money,  one  may  “spend  now,  pay  later”,  that  is,  one  may  receive  something  today  merely  on 
the  promise  to  deliver  “money”  tomorrow.  The  “money”  to  be  delivered  tomorrow  will  take  the 
form  of  a money-denominated  means  of  payment;  it  can  be  obtained  by  exchange  in  the  market. 
While  the  earliest  monetary  liabilities  were  merely  two  party  contracts,  gradually,  privately 
created  liabilities  (denominated  in  the  wheat  money  of  account)  began  to  circulate  and  function 
as  media  of  exchange  and  as  means  of  payment.  In  order  to  enhance  the  ability  of  privately 
created  money-denominated  liabilities  to  circulate,  IOUs  would  be  “accepted”  by  trustworthy 
individuals  or  institutions,  through  an  endorsement  that  guaranteed  the  IOU.3o A  primary 
21 example  of  a privately  created  liability  that  circulated  among  third  parties  is  the  inland  bill  of 
exchange.31  A  bill  is  created  as part  of  a forward  contract  which  is  written  in  terms  of  the 
money  of  account;  the  bill  may  circulate  (especially  on  endorsement)  among  third  parties  as  a 
means  of  payment  and  as  a medium  of  exchange,  or  it  may  be  held  as  a store  of  wealth;  the 
liability  represented  by  the  bill  will  be  retired  through  the  use  of  a means  of  payment--either 
another  bill  drawn  on  a third  party,  commodity  money,  or  fiat  money--at  which  point  the  money 
of  account  created  as part  of  the  (bill  of  exchange)  forward  contract  is  destroyed.32 
This  brings  us  to  the  primary  problem  of  a privately  created  money-denominated  liability  when 
it  is  used  as  a means  of  payment,  medium  of  exchange,  or  store  of  wealth:  its  issuer  might 
default.  To  further  increase  the  circulability  of  private  IOUs,  these  would  be  made  convertible 
under  specified  conditions  into  other  media  of  exchange.  Thus,  the  early  private  liabilities, 
written  in  terms  of  the  wheat  unit  of  account,  would  be  made  convertible  into  wheat.  Later, 
these  would  be  made  convertible  into  the  precious-metal-wheat-denominated,  stamped,  metal 
bars  issued  by  temples.  Finally,  after  the  development  of  stamped  coins,  private  liabilities  could 
be  made  convertible  into  currency.  At  all  stages,  however,  private  liabilities  were  also  made 
convertible  into  other  private  liabilities--normally  into  those  issued  by  relativelv  more  credit 
worthy  individuals  and  institutions. 
A  brief  exploration  of  the  history  of  commodity  money  is  in  order  to  demonstrate  that  it  is  not 
the  “natural”  form.  Keynes  shows  that  the  early  money  of  account  in  Babylonia  was  the  mina,  a 
unit  of  measurement  consisting  of  10,800  grains  of  wheat.  [Keynes  1982,  pp.  231-2731  He  notes 
“the  unit  of  weight  is  given  by  counting  grains  of  wheat”.  [Keynes  1982,  p.  2331 As  another 
example,  the  Roman  pound  was  equal  to  6912  grains  of  wheat.  Furthermore,  “all  weight 
standards  of  the  ancient  and  also  of  the  medieval  world...have  been  based  on  either  the  wheat 
grain  or  the  barley  grain.”  [Keynes  1982,  p.  2391 Of  course,  weight  units  pre-exist  money--they 
were  already  in  use  to  measure  tribute  paid  to  temples.  [Heinsohn  and  Steiger  1983,  p.  221 
These  weight  units  were  carried  over  into  the  monetary  units  in  which  credit  money  and,  later, 
commodity  money  were  denominated.  It  is  significant  that  the  standard  coins  of  Greece  and 
22 Babylonia  (the  stater  and  shekel,  respectively)  each  had  a weight  equivalent  to 
grains--implying  that  the  unit  of  account  came  before  the  coins.  [Heinsohn  and 
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Steiger  1983,  p. 
Cipolla  also  acknowledges  that  “the  notion  of  money”  underlying  the  names  of  monetary  units 
and  coins  in  the  Middle  Ages  was  “the primitive  notion  of  a standard  of  weight”  [Cipolla  1956, 
p.  71, but  he  goes  on  to  argue  that  this  is  “rather  peculiar”  and,  incorrectly  in  my  view,  attributes 
it  to  a movement  away  from  a  “monetary  economy”  and  toward  a  “barter  economy”  in  the 
Middle  Ages.  Actually,  weight  had  always  been  the  basis  of  monetary  units.  Thus,  it  is  not  a 
coincidence  that  the  “ghost  money”  used  throughout  Europe  after  the  tenth  century  was 
denominated  in  the  pound.  This  was  not  due  to  the  “longing  of  medieval  man”  (as  Einaudi 
believed);  rather,  the  money  of  account  was  traditionally  measured  in  weight  units,  a practice 
that  can  be  traced  to  the  early  wheat/barley  units  of  ancient  times.  Indeed,  the  Babylonian  mina 
money  of  account  averaged  504  grams  (10,800  wheat  grains),  which  is  very  close  to  the  modem 
pound.  [Heinsohn  and  Steiger  1987,  p.  2371 The  Babylonian  shekel,  or  the  Milanese  ducatoon, 
or  the  French  ecu  coins  were  all  valued  in  terms  of  the  money  of  account,  which,  in  turn,  was 
always  a weight  unit.  Precious  metals  were  not  chosen  to  be  used  as  coins  because  they  are 
intrinsically  worthy,  rather,  they  were  chosen  for  technical  reasons,  and  their  worth  was  derived 
from  the  value  of  the  social  unit  of  account  (wheat  or  barley).  Credit  money  would  also  be 
denominated  in  the  money  of  account;  as long  as  the  debtor  did  not  default  on  his/her  liability, 
the  credit  money  could  not  be  debased  relative  to  the  money  of  account.  However,  commoditv 
money  (gold,  silver,  or  copper  coins)  could  be  debased  relative  to  the  money  of  account  through 
clipping  or  reduction  of  fineness.  This  is because  once  it has  been  established  (eg,  during 
Charlemagne’s  reign)  that  twenty  coined  silver  shillings  of  the  maximum  obtainable  purity  shall 
weigh  one  pound,  any  reduction  of  weight  or  purity  will  devalue  the  shilling  (so  that  more  are 
required  to  equal  the  pound  unit  of  account),  but  this  will  not  devalue  the  money  of  account  o_r 
the  value  of  credit  money  denominated  in  the  unit  of  account.  It  is  significant  that  the  value  of 
minted  coins  was  frequently  determined  not  by  nominal  face  value,  but  by  weighing--to  take 
23 account  of  clipping  and  loss  of  metal  in  coins  due  to  normal  wear  caused  by  handling  (losses 
due  to  wear  alone  amounted  to  one  percent  per  year  [Munro  19791). 
Einaudi  argued  that  the  ghost  money  was  never  coined;  in  contrast,  Cipolla  argues  that  all  the 
ghost  monies  were  coined  in  the  late  Mediterranean  world.  Because  he,  like  Einaudi,  identifies 
“real  money”  with  media  of  exchange,  rather  than  with  the  unit  of  account,  he  assumes  that 
“ghost  monies”  were  created  to  simplify  transactions  in  a variety  of  media  of  exchange,  but  is 
forced  to  conclude  that  by  the  fourteenth  century,  “the ghosts  were  bringing  confusion  all 
around.”  [Cipolla  1956,  p.  491 Actually,  things  were  not  so  confused  as  Cipolla  believes.  In 
Roman  times,  the  gold  solidus  was  minted  at  the  rate  of  72  coins  per  pound  of  gold  (thus,  the 
coined  unit  was  equal  to  one  seventy-second  of  a pound  of  gold--the  money  of  account).  This 
same  unit  was  later  adopted  in  medieval  Italy  as  the  florin,  72  of  which  equalled  a pound  of 
gold.  However,  in  the  eleventh  century,  Charlemagne  adopted  a silver  pound  unit  of  account, 
such  that  a pound  of  silver  was  equal  to  twenty  shillings,  or  240  pennies;  only  the  pennies  were 
coined,  but  accounts  also  could  be  kept  in  terms  of  shillings  and  pounds.  Cipolla  calls  the  pound 
and  shilling  the  ghost  monies  of  account.  At  the  same  time,  the  gold  florin  also  circulated,  and 
was  equal  to  one  of  Charlemagne’s  silver  “imaginary”  pounds,  or  to  20  “imaginary”  shillings. 
Eventually,  however,  a shilling  coin  was  minted,  leading  Cipolla  to  argue  that  the  ghost  money 
was  coined.  Over  time,  the  quantities  of  precious  metals  in  the  shilling  and  penny  coins  were 
reduced;  thus,  by  1445,  it took  768  penny  coins  to  equal  a real  pound  of  silver  or  a real  florin 
coin;  by  the  early  17OOs, 266  real  shilling  coins  were  required  to  equal  one  real  florin  gold  coin 
(which  was  never  debased).  However,  according  to  Cipolla,  in  imaginary  terms,  a pound  was 
still  defined  as  20  shillings  or  as  240  pennies;  thus,  even  though  the  real  florin  coin  was  worth 
768  pennies,  Cipolla  claims  the  ghost  florin  was  now  worth  384  pennies  so  that  one  real  florin 
was  worth  two  ghost  florins--leading  to  Cipolla’s  remark  concerning  “confusion  all  around”. 
There  is  a simple  explanation  for  this:  Charlemagne’s  pound  was  no  longer  the  money  of 
account.  Charlemagne’s  attempt  to  shift  to  a silver-pound  unit  of  account  would  be  successful 
only  so  long  as  the  silver  coins  were  not  debased,  in  which  case  they  would  retain  a stable 
24 exchange  rate  with  the  gold  florin  (which  was  explicitly  based  on  gold).  However,  as  the  silver 
coins  became  debased,  they  lost  value  relative  to  the  gold-denominated  money  of  account;  even 
where  accounts  were  explicitly  kept  in  terms  of  silver  pounds,  shillings,  or  pennies,  conversion 
to  the  gold  money  of  account  was  necessary  because  the  silver  “imaginary”  pound  (based  on 
240  debased  pennies)  continuously  fell  in  value.  Cipolla  argues  that  “all the  systems  of  account 
in  existence  in  those  days  were  actually  based  on  and  tied  to  a real  coin”  [Cipolla  1956,  p.  501; 
clearly  this  was  not  the  case.  The  systems  of  account  were  based  on  a precious  metal  weight 
equivalent.  This  would  be  consistent  with  the  units  used  for  coinage  only  so  long  as  the  coins 
remained  “full-bodied”  precious  metal  coins.  Thus,  the  recognition  that  the  money  of  account 
(“imaginary  money”)  comes  before  any  particular  commodity  money  allows  us  to  clear  up  the 
confusion  in  the  accounts  of  Einaudi  and  Cipolla.33 
With  the  development  of  precious  metal  coins,  we  finally  arrive  at the  “goldsmith”  stage,  at 
which  orthodox  theory  begins,  with  a commodity  money  (gold)  that  is  deposited  with  the 
goldsmith,  who  discovers  the  “deposit  expansion  process”.34  Actually,  the  process  worked  in 
reverse,  A  commodity  money  could  not  have  developed  before  the  development  of  a money  of 
account--which  is  necessarily  the  result  of  private  debt  contracts.  The  private  liabilities  created 
in  these  contracts  have  circulated  before  and  concurrently  with  commodity  money  as  media  of 
exchange  and  means  of  payment.  The  commodity  money  is developed  for  technical  reasons,  but 
becomes  the  reserve  money  because  private  credit  money  is  subject  to  default  risk,  and 
exchange  rate  risk.  (That  is,  the  holder  of  private  credit  money  faces  the  risk  that  the  value  of 
this  money  will  fall  relative  to  the  money  of  account.)  It is  not  that  deposits  of  commodity 
money  make  loans  and  credit  money;  rather,  loans  and  credit  money  generate  a desire  to  hold 
small  reserves  of  commodity  money  in  order  to  ensure  convertibility.  Gold,  and  so  on,  is  not 
money,  nor  has  it ever  been  money.35  Money  is  the  socially  determined  unit  of  account,  but  all 
privately  issued  money-denominated  liabilities  expose  their  holder  to  at least  some  risk,  and  to 
make  this  risk  palatable,  credit  money  is  made  convertible  into  other  forms  of  money- 
denominated  assets.  The  full-bodied  commodity  money  is  the  risk-free  representation  of  the 
25 social  measure  of  value;  as  such,  it is  initially  chosen  as the  “ultimate”  backing  for  credit 
money. 
The  quantity  of  commodity  money  available,  as discussed  above,  never  constrains  the  money 
of  account  supply.  This  means  that  wholesale  conversion  (“liquidation”)  of  private  IOUs  can 
never  be  accomplished  in  the  aggregate.  That  is,  a credit  money  economy  based  on  a 
commodity  money  reserve  collapses  if  there  are  attempts  at  conversion.  However,  declining 
confidence  can  lead  to  a  “run”  on  credit  money,  which  cannot  be  met  through  liquidation. 
Instead,  a trusted  individual  or  institution  would  try  to  qualm  the  fears  of  holders  of  credit 
money  by  certifying  the  financial  soundness  of  the  issuer.  If  confidence  could  not  be  restored, 
the  issuer  would  default  and  the  credit  money  would  lose  its  value.  This  could  generate 
additional  runs,  could  degenerate  into  a financial  panic,  and  could  lead  to  a debt  deflation. 
As  in  the  case  of  all  other  capitalist  countries,  England  developed  a  “pyramidal”  financial 
system.36  Each  economic  agent  would  issue  liabilities  made  convertible  into  liabilities  of  an 
agent  higher  in  the  pyramid.  Thus,  a firm  would  make  its  liabilities  convertible  into  country 
bank  notes  (typically,  the  “borrowing”  firm  would  enter  into  an  agreement  with  an  “accepting” 
bank,  issuing  a bill  of  exchange  denominated  in  the  bank’s  liabilities).  The  country  banks,  in 
turn,  made  their  notes  convertible  into  notes  issued  by  London  banks.37 These  London  banks 
would  hold  the  “reserves”  of  country  banks,  which  included  stocks,  bonds,  and  London  bank 
notes  and  deposits.  If  a run  began  on  a country  bank,  the  London  bank  would  lend  its  notes 
against  the  reserves  of  the  country  bank.  However,  this  arrangement  was  not  sufficient  to  stop 
periodic  financial  crises.  The  obvious  problem  with  a private  lender  of  last  resort  is  that  its 
ability  to  stop  runs  by  issuing  its  liabilities  is  always  constrained.  First,  it  must  worry  about  its 
net  worth,  and  second,  it must  worry  about  a run  on  its  own  notes.38 
Historically,  governments  had  been  typically  very  constrained  in  their  ability  to  borrow  or  to 
issue  fiat  money.  Individuals  and  institutions  were  reluctant  to  accept  government  liabilities, 
partially  due  to  frequent  governmental  defaults3’  Governments  also  tried  to  issue  “fiat”  coins: 
these  were  coins  whose  embodied  precious  metal  was  less  than  the  promised  value  in  terms  of 
26 the  unit  of  account.  In  reality,  such  coins  were  nothing  more  than  government  debt:  one  would 
take  gold  to  the  government  mint  and  receive  the  fiat  coins  that  represented  a promise  by  the 
government  that  these  could  be  exchanged  in  the  future  for  gold.  (In  this  case,  the  coin  really 
was  no  different  than  the  paper  used  to  register  forward  contracts;  the  coins  were  merely  the 
physical  evidence  of  debt  contracts.  This  is  why  they  frequently  had  cows  or  other  physical 
objects  printed  on  them--long  before  the  head  of  the  king  appeared  on  coins.)  However,  those 
who  received  the  coin  always  faced  the  risk  that  at some  later  date  the  King  would  declare  a 
lower  value,  in  terms  of  the  unit  of  account,  for  the  fiat  coins.  Indeed,  experience  proved  that 
governments  frequently  tried  to  obtain  purchasing  power  through  this  method,  thus,  government 
money  normally  would  not  circulate  unless  it  took  the  form  of  commodity  money,  with  its  value 
determined  by  the  amount  of  embodied  precious  metal.  In  this  case,  debasement  through 
clippage  or  reduction  of  the  amount  of  precious  metal  would  merely  lead  to  rising  prices  in 
terms  of  the  government  money;  thus,  the  government  unable  to  issue  fiat  money.4o 
The  early  US  government  was  similarly  constrained  in  its  ability  to  issue  coins,  by  the  quantity 
of  precious  metals.41 When  the  U.S.  mint  was  first  created  to  provide  small  coins,  it  found  itself 
faced  with  a shortage  of  copper--the  precious  metal  used  for  the  cent.  The  modem  reader  would 
expect  that  the  mint  would  have  substituted  a common,  cheaper  metal.  However,  at  this  time, 
this  would  merely  have  caused  the  value  of  the  cent  to  fall  below  one  one-hundredth  of  a dollar 
(the  unit  of  account).  Thus,  a mint  worker  (Henry  Voight)  “cleverly  thought  to  substitute  a small 
plug  of  silver  in  the  center  of  a small  copper  cent.  This  allowed  the  mint  to  use  much  less 
copper,  while  retaining  a full  cent’s  worth  of  metal.”  [Stevenson,  19921 
The  inability  to  obtain  purchasing  power  by  creating  fiat  money  was  finally  solved  through  the 
development  of  central  banking.  As  no  private  bank  wanted  to  run  the  risk  of  accepting 
government  liabilities  that  might  be  devalued  by  fiat,  they  had  to  be  offered  incentives  to  do  so. 
The  Bank  of  England  was  first  created  to  provide  purchasing  power  to  the  government  by 
purchasing  government  debt  and  issuing  bank  notes.  In  return,  it  was  granted  various  monopoly 
rights  and  other  advantages.  Perhaps  the  most  important  advantage  was  the  sole  right  to  issue 
27 notes  in  London.  (In  other  countries,  private  bank  notes  were  taxed  out  of  existence,  again 
giving  de  facto  monopoly  rights  over  note  issue  to  central  banks.)  As  London  was  the  financial 
center,  and  as  country  banks  already  “pyramided”  liabilities  on  London,  the  Bank  of  England 
became  the  reserve  bank.  This  essentially  gave  the  government  vast  purchasing  power,  for  the 
Bank  of  England  could  buy  government  debt  and  its  notes  (denominated  in  the  money  of 
account)  would  function  as  fiat  money  that  was  always  desired  since  it functioned  as  the 
reserve.  Gradually,  a  “mono-reserve”  system  was  developed,  with  Bank  of  England  liabilities 
serving  as  the  primary  reserve  and  as  the  apex  of  the  debt  pyramid.  [Wray  19901 This  is  the 
prototypical  arrangement  now  found  in  all  capitalist  countries. 
In  all  private  property  economies,  then,  money  is  a unit  of  account,  created  by  a promise  to 
pay.  A  pyramid  of  these  promises  evolves--each  backed  by  (or  made  convertible  into)  a promise 
higher  in  the  pyramid.  Generally,  only  the  liabilities  issued  by  those  who  are  relatively  high  in 
the  pyramid  will  circulate  as means  of  payment  and  media  of  exchange.  Over  time,  there  has 
been  a continual  narrowinq  of  the  types  of  liabilities  that  will  circulate,  to  those  in  the  highest 
reaches  of  the  pyramid.  Thus,  the  financial  system  has  evolved  from  one  in  which  a wide 
variety  of  types  of  liabilities  circulated  to  one  in  which  government  liabilities  and  the  liabilities 
of  banks  comprise  the  vast  majority  of  the  circulating  supply  of  means  of  payment  and  media  of 
Central  bank  “fiat”  money  is,  like  all  privately  created  money,  merely  an  IOU--a  debt 
denominated  in  the  money  of  account;  that  is,  central  bank  money  and  private  money  have 
always  been  “fiat”  money.  Furthermore,  central  bank  fiat  money  was  not  the  first  type  of 
government  fiat  money.  Historically,  there  were  examples  of  government  fiat  money  that 
circulated  before  the  creation  of  central  banks--although  this  was  the  exception  rather  than  the 
rule.  For  example,  some  of  the  Italian  city-states  were  able  to  issue  government  liabilities  that 
circulated  regionally  at a nominal  value  stated  in  terms  of  the  unit  of  account.  One  of  the 
reasons  for  the  success  of  the  money-denominated  liabilities  issued  by  the  city-states  seems 
be  that  all  the  citizens  of  the  cities  were  held  to  be  individually  responsible  with  unlimited 
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t0 liability  for  city  debts.  In  other  cases,  governments  usually  could  only  issue  liabilities  backed  by 
a specific  revenue  source  (for  example,  it was  common  for  a Crown  to  borrow  against  future  tax 
revenues--“anticipation”  of  taxes).  Perhaps  the  most  important  development  that  gave 
governments  the  ability  to  issue  fiat  money  was  the  creation  of  representative  democracy--in 
which  case  government  debt  represents  the  debt  of  its  citizenry,  much  as  the  debt  of  the  city- 
states  was  a debt  of  its  citizens.  In  conjunction  with  a gold  standard,  this  would  allow  a 
government  to  issue  fiat  money--representing  a promise  to  convert  paper  or  coin  to  gold--that 
would  circulate  at  a value  stated  in  terms  of  the  unit  of  account.  While  this  development 
deserves  more  attention,  it is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  article  except  to  notice  that  governments 
certainly  did  not  begin  by  issuing  fiat  money.  Indeed,  the  full-bodied  commodity  money  is  a 
special  puroose  money  issued  by  governments  that  are not  sufficiently  credit-worthy  that  their 
liabilities  will  be  accepted.  Governments  were  able  to  issue  this  commodity  money  because  the 
money  of  account  was  a metal-weight  unit,  and  pot  because  gold  is  naturally  money. 
While  the  first  central  banks  were  created  to  provide  government  finance,  they  gradually 
discovered  that  their  position  at the  apex  gave  them  the  ability  to  function  as  lenders  of  last 
resort.43 As  they  could  essentially  provide  reserves  without  limit  merely  by  discounting  the 
assets  of  other  banks,  they  could  always  stop  a run.  This  greatly  increases  the  stability  of  the 
capitalist  system,  for  it  solves  the  primary  problem  of  a commodity  reserve  system:  the  supply 
of  reserves  becomes  elastic.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  the  central  bank  controls  the 
supply  of  privately  issued  money-denominated  liabilities--the  quantity  of  Federal  Reserve 
liabilities  does  not  limit  the  supply  of  (dollar)  unit  of  account  money  any  more  than  the  supply 
of  wheat  limited  the  supply  of  wheat  money  of  account.  It  merely  means  that  an  accommodative 
central  bank  can  prevent  debt  deflations,  while  a commodity  reserve  system  cannot  because  the 
supply  of  the  commodity  money  cannot  accommodate  the  need  for  reserves.  It  also  helps  to 
narrow  the  types  of  liabilities  that  will  circulate--those  guaranteed  by  the  central  bank  will 
displace  others.  However,  this  is  true  only  to  the  extent  that  the  central  bank  does  accommodate 
the  need  for  reserves. 
29 A  system  that  relies  on  accumulation  functions  more  smoothly  if  debt  deflations  are  avoided. 
The  purpose  of  accumulation  in  a capitalist  economy  is not  to  accumulate  widgets,  nor  is  it even 
to  accumulate  widget-making  machines.  Accumulation  has  only  one  purpose:  “to end  up  with 
more  money  than  it  started  with”.  [Keynes  1979,  p.  891 The  “money”  to  be  accumulated  is,  of 
course,  comprised  of  the  assets  denominated  in  the  money  of  account;  this  is  the  social  measure 
of  wealth.  A  run  to  liquidity  generates  defaults  and  halts  the  accumulation  process;  it even  leads 
to  significant  decumulation  of  wealth  if  it  spreads.  A  system  based  on  commodity  money 
reserves  will  periodically  experience  debt  deflations;  in  contrast,  a central  bank  reserve  system 
need  not,  thus,  supports  accumulation.  An  accommodative  supply  of  reserves  is  a fundamental 
advance  over  the  commodity  reserve  system  because  it  eliminates  decumulation  at  the  aggregate 
level.  Again,  an  accommodative  supply  of  reserves  is essential;  to  the  extent  that  the  central 
bank  tries  to  constrain  the  growth  of  reserves,  it  abandons  its  responsibility  for  sustaining 
accumulation. 
As  mentioned  above,  when  credit  money  is  denominated  in  the  money  of  account,  its  nominal 
value  can  fall  only  when  it is  devalued  relative  to  the  money  of  account  (for  example,  due  to 
fear  that  its  issuer  will  default).  However,  after  the  development  of  commodity  money,  some 
private  liabilities  were  made  convertible  into  coins,  and  some  credit  money  was  denominated  in 
commodity  money  (say,  silver  shilling  coins)  rather  than  in  the  money  of  account  (say,  gold 
“imaginary”  pounds).44  In  the  absence  of  debasement,  it  would  not  really  matter  whether  credit 
money  were  denominated  in  commodity  money  or  in  the  unit  of  account.  However,  as 
discussed,  debasement  of  coins  became  common  in  medieval  Europe;  this  added  a further 
avenue  through  which  credit  money  could  lose  value,  as  any  credit  money  denominated  in  the 
debased  coin  would  lose  value  relative  to  a money  of  account.  On  the  other  hand,  the  debtor 
whose  liabilities  were  denominated  in  the  (gold  pound)  money  of  account  would  find  that 
repayment  in  terms  of  a debased  (silver  shilling)  coin  became  more  difficult--increasing  the 
likelihood  of  default.  In  medieval  europe,  both  types  of  private  credit  money  existed:  some  was 
denominated  in  the  unit  of  account,  while  other  credit  money  was  denominated  in  terms  of 
30 coins.  The  “dual”  system  consisting  of  an  invariable  unit  of  account  with  commodity  money 
whose  value  relative  to  the  money  of  account  was  determined  by  the  quantity  of  embodied 
precious  metal  was  not  conducive  to  an  economic  system  based  on  credit  relations.  As  Cipolla 
[ 1956,  p.  501 argued,  a system  based  on  a stable  coin  would  favor  creditors  and  rentiers,  while  a 
system  based  on  a deteriorating  coin  favored  debtors  and  entrepreneurs.  In  fact,  these  divergent 
outcomes  arise  because  the  system  is  based  on  a money  of  account  but  debts  could  be  written  in 
terms  of  a coin  (which  might  be  debased)  or  in  terms  of  the  money  of  account. 
Polanyi  [ 19681 writes  of  an  attempt  to  “commodify”  money  (another  of  his  “fictitious 
commodities”)  as countries  throughout  europe  established  a gold  standard.  Actually,  in  one 
sense,  the  “gold  standard”  was  nothing  new--since  Roman  times,  europe  had  used  the  pound  as 
the  unit  of  account.  The  establishment  of  the  international  gold  standard  actually  represented  an 
attempt  to  prevent  debasement  of  commodity  moneys  within  countries  (and  debasement  of 
national  currencies  among  countries).  Credit  money  could  then  be  denominated  in  the 
commodity  money  and  made  convertible  into  commodity  money;  the  commodity  money  would 
be  made  convertible  into  gold  at  a fixed  rate  of  exchange  as established  by  the  money  of 
account  (a pound  bank  note  can  be  converted  into  so  many  shillings;  so  many  shillings  equal  a 
pound  sterling;  so  many  pounds  sterling  equal  an  ounce  of  gold).  With  the  gold  standard,  there 
is  no  longer  a distinction  between  credit  money  denominated  in  the  money  of  account  versus 
credit  money  denominated  in  terms  of  commodity  money.  When  devaluation  occurs,  it  means 
that  the  unit  of  account,  credit  money,  and  commodity  money  all  fall  in  value  relative  to & 
but  not  relative  to  one  another. 
This  brings  us  back  to  Einaudi’s  “ghost  money”:  one  of  the  functions  of  a commodity  money 
is  to  provide  a common  currency,  denominated  in  the  “ghost”  money  of  account,  into  which  all 
other  “moneys”  are  convertible.  This  is  necessary  so  accounts  may  eventually  be  cleared;  the 
commodity  money  could  be  used  to  settle  net  debits.  With  the  development  of  fiat  currency, 
denominated  in  the  unit  of  account  and  the  value  of  which,  in  turn,  was  fixed  relative  to  gold, 
we  have  a  “domicile  currency”  used  to  clear  accounts.  The  earliest  example  was  the  Bank  of 
31 Amsterdam  which  guaranteed  a uniform  gold  unit  of  account  used  as  the  common  denominator 
for  various  media  of  exchange,  all  of  which  represented  debts.  The  uniform  unit  of  account 
(both  domestically  and  internationally)  was  necessitated  by  the  dominant  use  of  bills  of 
exchange--if  the  various  bills  were  made  convertible  only  into  private  domestic  liabilities,  their 
values  would  be  exceedingly  uncertain.  Thus,  the  “gold  standard”  did  not  arise  “naturally”  as 
money  was  invented,  but  was  created  because  most  money  took  the  physical  form  of  privately- 
issued  bills  of  exchange  (and  other  private  liabilities).  Of  course,  in  the  U.S.,  we  had  treasury 
notes,  denominated  in  the  dollar  unit  of  account  and  (at  one  time)  also  made  convertible  into 
precious  metal  at  a fixed  exchange  rate--these  fiat  notes  served  as  a reserve  for  private  liabilities 
and  they  were  used  to  clear  accounts.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  U.S.  “ghost  money”  & 
“coined”  very  early  in  the  history  of  the  country,  while  the  european  “ghost  money”  remained 
uncoined  for  centuries.  This  ability  of  the  government  to  issue  by  fiat  the  unit  of  account  money 
represents  a major  advance--but  it  also  conflicts  with  the  gold  standard,  itself,  because  a run  on 
a convertible  currency  results  in  loss  of  the  gold  reserve. 
Creation  of  the  gold  standard  eliminates  the  “dual  system”  mentioned  above,  in  which  debts 
could  be  written  in  terms  of  either  an  invariable  unit  of  account  or  a commodity  money  that 
could  be  debased.  With  a gold  standard,  credit  money  that  is  made  convertible  into  gold  can  fall 
in  value  relative  to  the  unit  of  account  only  in  the  case  of  banluuptcy  of  the  debtor.  Still, 
however,  such  bankruptcies  can  spread  whenever  there  is  a run  on  credit  money  due  to  the 
pyramidal  structure  of  debts  and  due  to  the  limited  quantity  of  gold  reserves.  Thus,  lender  of 
last  resort  intervention  is  required  to  prevent  debasement  of  credit  money  relative  to  the  money 
of  account;  this  is  possible  only  if  an  elastic  supply  of fiat  money  is  available--but  this  is  not 
consistent  with  a gold  standard.  This  is  why  the  central  banking  function  conflicts  with  a gold 
standard,  and  is  one  of  the  reasons  the  gold  standard  is  commonly  abandoned  during  crisis. 
The  gold  standard  permits  devaluation  of  a nation’s  unit  of  account  (due  to  a run  out  of  the 
currency  or  to  deliberate  government  policy)  relative  to  the  units  of  account  of  other  countries. 
As  the  pound  sterling  falls  relative  to  gold,  it also  falls  relative  to  the  German  mark.  Thus,  while 
32 the  gold  standard  resolves  the  problem  concerning  the  “dual  system”  within  a country,  it  does 
not  provide  an  invariable  international  unit  of  account.45  A  debt  denominated  in  the  dollar  unit 
of  account  will  fall  relative  to  the  value  of  the  pound  sterling  unit  of  account  whenever  the 
dollar  falls  relative  to  gold.  Furthermore,  the  gold  standard  is  as  unworkable  when  there  is  a run 
out  of  a particular  country’s  debts  and  currency  as  the  commodity  money  reserve  is  when  there 
is  a run  out  of  a particular  bank.  Just  as  the  national  system  requires  an  elastic  fiat  money 
reserve  system  to  stop  national  runs,  the  international  system  requires  an  elastic  fiat  money 
reserve  denominated  in  a universal  unit  of  account  to  stop  international  runs.  (Again,  the 
international  gold  standard  has  repeatedly  been  abandoned  during  crises.)  The  world  essentially 
adopted  a dollar  unit  of  account  after  WWII--but  the  international  monetary  system  broke  down 
again  in  the  early  1970s  when  the  US  abandoned  gold.  Even  though  the  dollar  has  remained  as 
the  primary  international  unit  of  account,  and  even  though  the  international  supply  of  dollar 
reserves  has  been  somewhat  elastic  (due  to  actions  of  the  Bank  for  International  Settlements,  the 
World  Bank,  the  IMF,  and  national  central  banks),  crisis  of  the  international  financial  system 
remains  one  of  the  most  important  problems  facing  the  world  today--a  topic  beyond  the  scope  of 
this  paper. 
CONCLUSIONS  AND  POLICY  IMPLICATIONS 
This  analysis  has  shown  the  orthodox  approach  to  money  and  to  policy  is  historically  and 
logically  flawed.  Money  was  not  injected  into  a well-functioning  barter  economy;  instead, 
money  and  the  market  developed  together.  This  helps  to  explain  why  production  in  a market 
economy  is  always  monetary  production:  money  now  for  more  money  later.  It  also  means  that 
the  money  supply  in  a monetary  economy  is necessarily  endogenously  determined.  Monetary 
economies  have  not,  and  cannot,  operate  with  exogenous  money  supplies.  Finally,  while  a 
monetary  economy  with  an  endogenous  money  supply  can  operate  with  a commodity  money 
reserve  system,  such  a system  is  subject  to  periodic  debt  deflations.  Thus,  in  all  developed 
capitalist  economies,  this  has  been  replaced  by  an  accommodative  central  bank  reserve  system. 
The  Monetarist  policy  prescription  (close  control  over  the  quantity  of  reserves)  represents  a 
33 giant  step  backward,  to  an  unstable  system  in  which  accumulation  suffers  occasional  reversals 
during  debt  deflations.  Furthermore,  Monetarist  policy  would  not  lead  to  greater  control  of  the 
money  supply--the  supply  of  reserves  (whether  of  wheat,  of  gold,  or  of  central  bank  liabilities) 
has  never  determined  the  quantity  of  money.  Rather,  rigid  control  over  reserves  would  eliminate 
the  primary  advantage  bank  liabilities  have  over  other  types  of  liabilities  and  would  lead  to 
greater  use  of  alternative  money-denominated  liabilities.  This,  however,  comes  at  the  expense  of 
the  revival  of  debt  deflations. 
Some  of  those  who  adopt  the  endogenous  money  supply  approach  argue  that  this  endogeneity 
is  a recent  phenomenon--either  due  to  a change  of  central  bank  practice  such  that  it  now 
accommodates  the  demand  for  reserves,  or  due  to  innovations  in  banking  that  have  allowed 
banks  to  escape  reserve  constraints.46  Thus,  it  is  argued  that  the  money  supply  was  exogenous 
in  the  past,  determined  by  the  quantity  of  commodity  money.  As  this  analysis  has  made  clear, 
however,  this  could  not  have  been  the  case.  The  current  system,  based  on  central  bank  reserves, 
did  not  evolve  out  of  a commodity  money  system.  Rather,  the  commodity  money  reserve 
evolved  out  of  an  endogenous  money  system  to  solve  one  of  the  problems  with  a monetary 
economy:  in  any  monetary  economy,  the  vast  majority  of  assets  denominated  in  the  money  of 
account  consists  of  private  IOUs,  the  value  of  which  depends  on  the  economic  condition  of  their 
issuers.  Thus,  commodity  money--a  riskless  representation  of  the  social  unit  of  account--was 
used  as  a reserve.  Privately-issued  money  liabilities  were  made  convertible  into  commodity 
money  merely  to  enhance  circulation,  but,  the  quantity  of  these  was  never  constrained  by  the 
quantity  of  commodity  money  in  existence. 
This  helps  to  make  it clear  that  an  exogenous  money  system  is  not  possible  in  an  economy 
that  is  based  on  nominal  accumulation.  One  might  imagine  a system  that  could  be  based  on 
exogenous  money,  but  this  would  have  to  be  a system  in  which  private  pursuit  of  wealth 
denominated  in  the  money  of  account  was  eliminated?7  While  a commodity  reserve  system  is 
possible,  it  is  far  more  unstable  than  a central  bank  reserve  system.  Rather  than  attempting  to 
constrain  the  central  bank  so  that  its  liabilities  are  supplied  we  had  a commodity  money 
34 reserve  system,  it  is  far  better  to  maintain  the  current  accommodative  reserve  system.  It  would 
be  difficult  to  improve  upon  Tooke’s  recommendations  concerning  appropriate  monetary  policy 
in  a monetary  economy: 
[T]he  greater  or  less  liability  to  variation  in  the  rate  of  interest  constitutes,  in  the  next 
degree  only  to  the  preservation  of  the  convertibility  of  the  paper  and  the  solvency  of 
banks,  the  most  important  consideration  in  the  regulation  of  our  banking  system.  [Tooke 
1959,  p.  1241 
35 NOTES 
1. The  orthodox  story  presented  here  can  be  found  in  the  typical  principles  and  money  and 
banking  texts.  See,  for  example,  Samuelson  [1973].  Orthodox  economic  historians  add  much 
detail  to  the  story;  see  Schweikart  [ 19911 for  a detailed  historiographical  survey  of  money  and 
banking  in  the  U.S.  While  these  economic  historians  would  reject  the  simple  orthodox  story 
presented  here,  their  historical  analyses  do  reflect  a similar  theoretical  position  regarding  the 
nature  of  money. 
2.  The  transition  from  a system  based  on  “paper  money”  (bank  notes)  to  one  based  on  deposits 
does  not  play  a prominent  role  in  orthodox  thought.  It  may  be  explained  as  a consequence  of 
taxes  placed  on  notes,  thus,  deposits  carried  lower  transactions  costs. 
3.  Or  is  it  to  serve  as  a lap  dog  for  rentier  interests?  See  May  and  Grant  [ 199 I]. 
4.  See  Ingrao  and  Israel  [ 19901. In  general,  even  under  very  strict  assumptions,  the  formalized 
Neoclassical  economy  is  not  likely  to  achieve  a unique  equilibrium  as  defined  by  a vector  of 
relative  prices.  Even  if  equilibrium  can  be  shown  to  exist,  that  equilibrium  is  not  likely  to  be 
unique,  nor  can  it  be  shown  to  be  stable.  Thus,  even  if  an  equilibrium  price  vector  can  be  found, 
there  is  no  assurance  that  the  economy  would  tend  toward  it. 
5.  Indeed,  many  “economic”  activities  do  not  involve  choice.  For  example,  according  to  Dalton, 
“in  subsistence  (non-market)  economies,  the  question  of  choice  among  real  alternatives  does  not 
arise  in  such  explicit  fashion...the  Trobriander  is  born  into  a yam-growing  economy.  He  does 
not  ‘choose’  to  plant  yams”,  no  more  than  the  American  ‘chooses’  to  learn  to  speak  English. 
[Dalton,  1971,  p.  781 
6.  This  discussion  follows  that  of  Stanfield  [ 1986,  p.  341. However,  he  defines  substantive 
economics  as  the  study  of  institutionalized  interactions  with  nature.  I think  this  is  too  narrow; 
we  should  also  include  the  study  of  institutionalized  interactions  among  humans. 
7.  Some  might  question  whether  “economics”  can  be  applied  to  pre-capitalist  societies,  for  it 
could  be  questioned  whether  these  exhibit  an  economic  “system”  at  all.  I  answer  these  questions 
36 affirmatively;  as  Dalton  argues,  “it is  useful  to  regard  all  communities  or  societies  as  having 
economic  systems.  The  word  ‘system’  refers  to  structured  arrangements  and  rules  which  assure 
that  material  goods  and  specialist  services  are  provided  in  a repetitive  fashion.”  [Dalton,  1971, 
p.  881 However,  one  should  not  fall  into  the  “universalist”  trap  of  formalist  economics,  which 
seeks  to  define  all  human  behavior  as the  result  of  constrained  choice.  Arguing  that  all  societies 
exhibit  an  economic  system  does  not  imply  that  all  have  the  same  “structured  arrangements  and 
rules”  of  provisioning. 
8.  According  to  Polanyi  and  Stanfield,  it  is  only  where  productive  activities  are  divorced  from 
other  social  activities  that  we  can  identify  the  “economy”  as  a separate  entity;  where  this  occurs, 
we  can  observe  the  “laws”  of  supply  and  demand  operating  in  a  “self-regulating  market 
economy”.  [Stanfield  1986,  p.  761 As  I will  discuss  in  more  detail  below,  I think  this  goes  too 
far:  while  the  “self-regulating  market  economy”  is  surely  the  normative  ideal  of  neoclassical 
economics,  it  has  never  been  achieved;  “supply  and  demand”  have  never  operated  separately 
from  other  social  forces.  That  is,  even  under  capitalism,  the  “economy”  can  never  be  observed 
as  functioning  separately  from  society.  However,  I agree  that  in  principle,  it  is easier  to  identify 
a  “logic”  of  the  capitalist  economic  system  that  operates  more  independently  from  human 
intentions  than  does  the  “logic”  of  other  economic  systems.  It  has  been  commonly  noted  that 
economic  theorv  really  did  not  exist  before  capitalism.  As  capitalism  develops,  the  “economy” 
becomes  sufficiently  separate  from  the  larger  social  setting  that  an  economics  discipline  is 
created.  See  Polanyi  [ 197 11. 
9.  See  Chick  [ 19861, Moore  [1988],  Niggle  [1990],  and  Wray  [1990]  for  such  treatments. 
10. Admittedly,  this  is  a difficult  and  controversial  task.  Two  factors  make  the  task  difficult:  as  I 
will  argue  below,  money  was  almost  certainly  “invented”  before  writing,  thus,  we  will  not  find 
its  origins  in  the  historical  record;  furthermore,  I believe  the  historical  record  as  interpreted  by 
comparative  historians  generally  suffers  from  an  incomplete  understanding  of  the  nature  of 
money.  (Comparative  anthropologists  are  closer  to  the  mark,  as  I will  argue.)  This  means  that  I 
37 must  reconstruct  “history”  using  comparative  economics.  Thus,  what  follows  is  necessarily  a 
speculative  first  attempt  at  discovering  the  origins  of  money,  and  at reconstructing  the 
development  of  the  modern  financial  system.  Those  who  have  written  the  “monographs” 
studying  particular  economies  can  help  in  further  attempts  at this  reconstruction  by  filling  in  the 
details.  This  paper  must  isolate  only  those  most  important  variables  required  to  present  a concise 
picture;  the  world  is  obviously  much  more  complex. 
11. I  will  distinguish  “money”  from  those  assets  that  fulfill  functions  of  money  in  a moment. 
12. It  must  be  admitted  that  we  will  never  have  sufficient  historical  data  on  the  origins  of 
money  that  we  can  settle  the  issue  merely  on  the  basis  of  historical  Any  analysis  of  the 
origins  of  money  will  necessarily  rely  to  some  extent  on  historical  speculation.  Thus,  my 
criticism  of  Samuelson’s  approach  is  not  merely  that  his  interpretation  relies  on  speculation,  nor 
is  it  that  his  interpretation  conflicts  with  some  of  the  historical  facts.  Rather,  the  primary 
problem  with  the  orthodox  story  is  that  it is  illogical  and  that  it conflicts  with  our  understanding 
of  the  operation  of  a monetary  economy.  Thus,  I will  present  an  alternative  interoretation  of  the 
origins  of  money  and  monetary  production  that  is consistent  with  the  few  historical  facts 
available,  but  which  is  also  consistent  with  my  (explicitly  Post  Keynesian)  understanding  of 
money  and  of  monetary  production.  I also  want  to  emphasize  my  indebtedness  to  Heinsohn  and 
Steiger,  whose  work  greatly  influenced  my  view  on  the  origins  of  money  and  my  view  that 
money  has  always  been  endogenous. 
13. I will  use  the  term  “credit  money”  to  denote  privately  created,  money-denominated  liabilities 
that  fulfill  the  functions  of  money.  These  should  not  be  confused  with  money  itself.  See  the 
discussion  that  follows. 
14. See  Wray  [1990,  pp.  6-91 for  a detailed  critique  of  the  orthodox  notion  that  primitive  (that 
is,  pre-private  property)  societies  used  money.  See  also  Heinsohn  and  Steiger  [1983]. 
15. Thus,  self-interested  behavior  must  be  noneconomic;  it  must  be  displayed  in  behavior 
unrelated  to  the  production  and  distribution  of  society’s  means  of  livelihood.  In  tribal  society, 
38 economic  activity  cannot  be  gain-oriented  at  the  individual  level.  [Stanfield  1986,  p.  451 Pursuit 
of  gain  through  exchange  is  the  result  of  institutionally  enforced  patterns  of  behavior  that  arise 
with  the  development  of  private  property,  as  will  be  discussed  below.  In  tribal  society,  there  is 
no  well-conceived  concept  of  the  individual  separate  from  membership  in  the  clan;  as  such,  all 
“individual”  responsibility  was  social. 
16. Thus,  I  would  define  primitive  “exchange”  as  noneconomic  behavior,  having  next  to  nothing 
to  do  with  self-interested  behavior.  Rather,  such  “exchange”  was  a component  of  reciprocal  and 
redistributive  arrangements,  designed  to  reproduce  tribal  society--and  not  a step  on  the  road  to 
the  revolution  that  replaced  tribal  society  with  a monetary  economy.  See  Dalton  [ 1967;  19821. 
Tribal  “exchange”  is  an  outgrowth  of  the  institution  of  hospitality,  rather  than  an  expression  of 
selfishness. 
17. As  Dalton  notes,  “moneyless  market  exchange  was  not  an  evolutionary  stage  in  the  sense  of 
a dominant  mode  of  transaction  preceding  the  arrival  of  monetary  means  of  market  exchange. 
Barter  occurs  very  widely  in  past  and  present  economic  systems,  but  always  as  minor, 
infrequent,  or  emergency  transactions  employed  for  special  reasons  by  barterers  who  know  of 
alternative  and  more  important  ways  of  transacting”  [Dalton  1982,  p.  1881. 
18. Private  ownership  of  property  certainly  does  not  imply  completely  unconstrained  use  of  the 
property--all  societies  constrain  individual  use  of  property  to  some  extent.  When  the  rules 
“specifying  rights  of  acquisition  or  usage...are  expressions  of  kinship  or political  relationships, 
the  economic  component  is  inextricably  related  to  the  social,  and  we  have  a socio-economic 
practice,  institution,  or  process”.  [Dalton  1971,  p.  881 In  such  cases,  individual  initiative 
regarding  the  use  “private  property”  cannot  be  economicallv  important.  For  example,  when  land 
is  “acquired”  through  kinship  right  or  tribal  affiliation,  there  can  be  no  economically  significant 
“market”  in  land.  Polanyi’s  [ 19681 notion  of  “commodification”  perhaps  helps  to  define  “private 
property”,  however,  because  his  term  is  so  closely  identified  with  “a self-regulating  market 
economy”  it  may  imply  that  cornmodification  of  land  and  labor  did  not  appear  until  the 
39 nineteenth  century.  I do  not  use  the  term  “private  property”  so  narrowly--but  it  should  be 
recognized  that  there  is  a range  of  “privateness”,  that  is,  of  the  degree  to  which  rights  of 
acquisition  and  usage  are  constrained  by  kinship  and  political  relationships. 
19. By  uncertainty,  I mean  Keynesian  uncertainty,  not  risk.  Keynes  defined  uncertainty  as 
follows: 
By  “uncertain”  knowledge,  let  me  explain,  I do  not  mean  merely  to  distinguish  what  is 
known  for  certain  from  what  is  only  probable.  The  game  of  roulette  is  not  subject,  in 
this  sense  to  uncertainty;  nor  is  the  prospect  of  a Victory  bond  being  drawn.  Or,  again, 
the  expectation  of  life  is  only  slightly  uncertain.  Even  the  weather  is  only  moderately 
uncertain.  The  sense  in  which  I am  using  the  term  is  that  in  which  the  prospect  of  a 
European  war  is  uncertain,  or  the  price  of  copper  and  the  rate  of  interest  twenty  years 
hence,  or  the  obsolescence  of  a new  invention,  or  the  position  of  private  wealth  owners 
in  the  social  system  in  1970.  About  these  matters  there  is  no  scientific  basis  on  which  to 
form  any  calculable  probability  whatever.  We  simply  do  not  know.  [Keynes  1987,  pp. 
113-41 
20.  For  example,  debt  bondage  was  abolished  under  Solon  in  Athens  (approximately  600  B.C.). 
See  Heinsohn  and  Steiger  [1984]  for  a discussion  of  this,  and  for  an  analysis  of  the  development 
of  private  property  out  of  the  Mycenaean  tribute  economy. 
21.  As  Einaudi  adds,  “Eureka!“.  Medieval  man  found  monetary 
money. 
equilibrium  in  the  imaginary 
22.  Money  and  monetary  production  can  also  exist  in  a private  property,  slave  economy, 
however,  the  extent  of  the  market  must  remain  restricted.  Propertyless  wage  earners  are 
necessary  for  the  full  development  of  a  “market  economy”  in  which  monetary  production 
becomes  the  basis  of  the  economy. 
23.  In  the  aggregate,  sales  receipts  cannot  be  realized  until  wages  are  paid. 
40 24.  By  market,  I  do  not  mean  Polanyi’s  “self-regulating  free  market  economy”.  I use  the  term 
market  to  merely  indicate  that  some  goods  are produced  specifically  for  generalized  exchange, 
that  is,  for  economic  trade.  I do  not  include  ritualized  exchanges  common  in  tribal  society  that 
fulfill  reciprocal  and  redistributive  functions  (for  reasons  discussed  in  the  text,  I do  not  view 
these  as  “economic”).  However,  I also  do  not  mean  to  constrain  the  term  “market”  to  include 
only  exchanges  in  which  prices  are  “freely”  set  through  “supply  and  demand”.  The  normal  case 
(as  is  discussed  briefly  in  the  text)  is  for  prices  to  be  administered--in  pre-capitalist  society, 
market  prices  were  often  set  by  treaty;  in  capitalist  society,  prices  are  administered  by  firms 
with  market  power.  “Free”  markets  are  an  aberration,  no  matter  what  sort  of  society  one  is  to 
analyze.  Finally,  by  “market  system”,  I do  not  mean  a system  of  “supply  and  demand”  (or  “self- 
regulating”  economy);  rather,  I use  this  term  to  indicate  an  economic  system  in  which 
production  for  markets  has  become  a significant  economic  activity  of  the  society  under  analysis. 
Feudal  society  certainly  had  markets,  however,  the  role  of  the  market  in  feudal  society  was  very 
limited--essentially  to  external  trade,  and  to  trade  in  luxury  items.  [Stanfield  1986,  p.  971 In 
contrast,  most  production  in  capitalist  societies  (and  even  in  socialist  societies)  is  for  internal 
trade;  thus,  capitalist  societies  are  characterized  as  having  “market  systems”.  It  is irrelevant  for 
my  purposes  whether  prices  are  “free”  or  are  administered  (I agree  with  Polanyi  that  “free” 
markets  would  be  disastrous;  I disagree  over  whether  they  have  ever  been  widespread.) 
25.  Of  course,  workers  are  not  the  only  source  of  market  demand,  but  market  demand  would 
remain  restricted  until  a large  portion  of  the  population  relies  on  money  wages  for  subsistence. 
26.  Recall  the  distinction  made  above  between  a  “barter  economy”  and  “monetary  economy”:  as 
Keynes  argued,  a nonmonetary  economy  may  use  money  “for  transitory  convenience”,  but  most 
production  is  not  for  the  market.  Tribute  economies,  slave  economies,  and  feudal  economies  use 
money--this  is  beyond  question--but  none  can  be  characterized  as  “monetary  systems”;  most 
production  in  these  economies  is  not  “monetary  production”. 
41 27.  As  David  Herlihy  notes,  even  in  Renaissance  Florence  most  production  was  geared  toward 
luxury  items  for  the  rich  because  the  purchasing  power  of  the  average  european  was  simply  not 
sufficient  to  encourage  a market  in  common  items.  “The  Italians  of  the  Renaissance  period 
would  seem  to  have  had  the  ingenuity,  the  business  acumen,  and  the  capital  to  progress  in  the 
industrialization  of  production,  and  thus  to  lead  their  society,  and  perhaps  all  Europe,  towards 
industrialism.  But  the  character  of  the  market  would  not  readily  support  efforts  at  mechanization 
and  mass  production.”  [Herlihy  1977,  p.  151. 
28.  In  addition  to  the  enclosure  of  common  lands,  a labor  force  was  created  by  the  Statute  of 
Artificers,  by  imposing  penalties  for  vagabondage,  through  forcible  “liquidation”  of  the  clans 
lands  in  Scotland,  by  seizure  of  church  lands  (and  expulsion  of  peasants),  through  bankruptcy  of 
artisans  by  factory  production,  and  so  on. 
29.  This  guarantees  that  payment  commitments  grow  over  time  (at  the  loan  rate  of  interest).  See 
Wray  [1991a]  for  a detailed  discussion  of  the  relation  between  accumulation  and  the  rate  of 
interest.  Because  banks  are  profit-seekers,  they  will  not  “make  loans”  without  requiring  interest. 
This  means  that  in  the  aggregate,  outstanding  loans  will  grow  at a rate  determined  in  part  by  the 
rate  of  interest. 
30.  As  discussed  above,  temples  may  have  played  this  role  initially. 
3 1. The  first  bills  of  exchange  were  probably  foreign  bills  used  to  transfer  purchasing  power 
across  time  and  place.  Money  (as  a unit  of  account)  was  created  whenever  a  bill  was  drawn. 
soon  as  a bill  was  “accepted”  by  a  bank  or  acceptance  house,  it  became  a  “gilt  edge”  or  an 
“acceptance”,  which  could  be  used  as  a means  of  payment.  Interestingly,  goldsmiths  were 
among  the  primary  users  of  inland  bills  of  exchange--first  for  their  own  account  and  later  to 
As 
“transfer”  gold  for  their  customers  (it  would  be  the  bill  that  traveled,  not  the  gold).  Bills  of 
exchange  were  the  primary  medium  of  exchange  used  throughout  Europe  to  circulate  goods 
until  relatively  recently.  [Kregel  19881 
42 32.  See  Wray  [ 1990,  Chapter  21 and  Usher  [ 19531 for  discussions  of  the  history  of  the  bill  of 
exchange. 
33.  Frederic  Lane  provides  a very  similar  example  to  that  discussed  by  Cipolla.  In  Venice 
between  the  twelfth  and  fourteenth  centuries,  the  governments  experimented  with  a silver 
standard.  The  official  unit  of  account  was  the  silver  Libya or m  (pound)  composed  of  240 
denari  (pennies),  which  were  coined.  However,  over  time  the  various  coins  became  debased  due 
to  clipping,  wear  and  tear,  and  intentional  debasement  by  the  government  (that  is,  the  silver 
content  was  reduced).  This  led  to  the  development  of  at least  four  different  silver  moneys  of 
account.  Each  time  a new  silver  unit  of  account  was  created,  the  government  would  try  to  obtain 
purchasing  power  by  coining  it;  but  because  the  government  would  then  debase  the  coins,  these 
would  lose  value  such  that  more  were  required  to  equal  the  unit  of  account.  Even  when  the 
government  would  pass  laws  which  legally  determined  rates  of  exchange  for  the  coins  in  terms 
of  the  various  moneys  of  account,  these  would  not  hold  in  practice.  Indeed,  by  trying  to  set  a 
value  for  a coin  in  excess  of  its  silver  content  relative  to  a silver  money  of  account,  the  public 
would  merely  abandon  that  money  of  account.  The  search  for  an  “invariable  money”  led  Venice 
to  return  to  the  gold  money  of  account.  Thus,  Venice,  which  began  to  mint  the  gold  ducat  in  the 
thirteenth  century  (with  the  same  gold  content  as  the  florin),  returned  to  gold  in  the  fourteenth: 
“The  lira  di  grossi,  now  firmly  based  on  gold  ducats,  was  the  standard  of  value  used  in 
wholesale  trade,  banking,  and  foreign  exchange,  and  in  recording  and  paying  the  public  debt  and 
salaries  of  high  officials”  [Lane  1977,  p.  631. The  experience  of  Venice  follows  very  closely 
with  that  of  Charlemagne:  coining  the  money  of  account  leads  to  problems  unless  the  coin  is 
never  debased.  It  also  shows  that  contracts  could  be  written  in  a variety  of  moneys  of  account, 
and  in  a variety  of  coins.  Lane  discusses  the  problems  that  arose  when  contracts  were  written  in 
terms  of  a unit  of  account  or  a coin  that  was  falling  in  value.  (See  the  discussion  below.) 
34.  Actually,  goldsmiths  got  their  start  as  safe  depositories  for  gold  plate,  rather  than  coin,  and 
this  was  due  to  the  perfidy  of  Charles  I. That  is,  it certainly  was  not  “natural”  that  people  would 
leave  their  valuables  with  the  goldsmiths--they  did  it  only  out  of  fear  of  the  Crown.  [Private 
43 correspondence  from  J.A.  Kregel] 
35.  Significantly,  unstamped  or  unminted  metal  does  not  perform  the  functions  of  money. 
Reserves  of  gold  could  not  be  money.  The  money  of  account  must  have  existed  before  gold 
reserves  (denominated  in  the  unit  of  account)  could  be  money  reserves. 
36.  See  Foley  [ 19891 for  a discussion  of  the  financial  system  pyramid. 
37.  Often,  notes  could  be  redeemed  only  at the  London  bank.  This  may  have  reduced  the 
incentive  to  do  so,  but  to  some  extent,  it  was  a convenient  arrangement  for  many  noteholders  as 
a large  portion  of  transactions  took  place  in  London,  anyway. 
38.  Thus,  banks  worry  about  the  risk  of  not  being  able  to  validate  their  outstanding  liabilities, 
therefore,  have  a preference  for  liquid  assets.  No  bank  can  be  its  own  lender  of  last  resort;  this 
is  why  banks  charge  interest  on  “loans’‘--to  compensate  for  their  illiquid  positions  in  assets. 
39.  Of  course,  it  was  not  healthy  to  be  a creditor  of  a crown  in  financial  difficulty,  for  the 
crown  could  always  solve  its  debt  problems  through  imprisonment  or  execution  of  creditors. 
40.  See  Wray  [ 19901 for  a discussion  of  unsuccessful  attempts  at debasement,  and  for  a 
discussion  of  the  rise  of  the  Bank  of  England  as  the  central  bank  of  England. 
4 1. Furthermore,  coins  were  commonly  shaved  or  clipped  due  to  a shortage  of  small 
denomination  coins.  For  example,  the  U.S.  “bit”,  whose  value  was  originally  equal  to  an  eighth 
of  a Spanish  dollar,  was  created  by  literally  cutting  the  dollar  into  pieces  to  provide  small 
change. 
42.  For  example,  Cameron  [1967]  reports  that  bills  of  exchange  accounted  for  nearly  70  percent 
of  the  circulating  “money  supply”  in  1800,  while  bank  notes,  specie,  and  bank  deposits  together 
made  up  only  30  percent.  By  1855,  bank  deposits  alone  accounted  for  nearly  40  percent  of  the 
circulating  money  supply  (nearly  as large  a percent  as  bills).  See  Wray  [ 1990,  p.  691. Recently, 
this  trend  has  been  reversed  to  some  extent  in  the  US,  primarily  due  to  the  government’s 
apparent  willingness  to  guarantee  a broad  range  of  private  liabilities. 
44 43.  See  Bagehot  [1927]  for  a discussion  of  the  evolution  of  the  Bank  of  England’s  perception  of 
its  role  in  the  economy.  See  Tooke  [1959]  for  an  early  recognition  that  the  Bank  of  England 
could  function  as a central  bank. 
44.  As  mentioned  above  in  note  33,  Lane  [1977]  discusses  the  common  practice  of  writing 
contracts  in  terms  of  a variety  of  coins  and  moneys  of  account  in  Venice  in  the  thirteenth  and 
fourteenth  centuries. 
45.  However,  to  some  extent,  this  problem  was  mitigated  when  the  pound  sterling  was  used 
throughout  Europe  as the  international  unit  of  account  in  which  most  foreign  bills  of  exchange 
were  written--even  for  trade  between  two  countries  that  did  not  involve  the  UK. 
46.  See  Chick  [ 19861, Moore  [ 19911, and  Niggle  [ 19901 for  examples  of  a  “stages”  approach  to 
money  in  which  the  money  supply  is  exogenous  at certain  stages. 
47.  Thus,  an  exogenous  money  system  might  work  in  a socialist  society,  where  the  object  of 
production  is  to  provide  goods  and  services.  However,  a monetary,  capitalist  society  is  based  on 
accumulation  of  money-denominated  wealth,  and  not  on  production  of  goods  and  services.  As 
Veblen  argued,  the  purpose  of  capitalist  production  is  to  produce  pecuniary  values;  the 
production  of  use  values  occurs  only  as  a by-product  of  capitalist  production.  [Wray  1991b] 
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